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THE DISAPPEARANCE OF REALITY IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

Modern philosophy began in the winter of 1619-1620 at Neuberg on the Danube. It was here the idea first occurred to René Descartes that the attention of philosophers had been misplaced for centuries. Man is primarily a student of himself, not of nature. Too much precious time and thought, it appeared to him, had been mis-spent already on externals. It was unfortunate that the centre of human inquiry had ever shifted from man to things; and a second Socrates, teaching men to know *themselves,* before attempting to penetrate the secrets of the outer universe, would prove the man of the hour. Philosophy, like charity, should begin at home, and settle a pressing domestic problem, before venturing abroad in excess of zeal. Less of Anaxagoras and his starry firmament, more of Plato and his inner world of ideas, would rescue philosophy from its dotage and actually renew its youth. Philosophers had long enough indulged the habit of employing the human mind to investigate everything but itself. Descartes proposed to teach them to study, rather, the mechanism of the lamp with which they set out so confidently to explore the surrounding dark. Henceforth there was to be method, at least, in philosophic madness. Such was the new career mapped out for modern philosophy by a French mathematician well nigh three hundred years ago.

To secure an unbiassed starting-point Descartes chose the method of doubting everything that his predecessors had taught. He thus hoped to begin with a clean slate, to turn over a new leaf, as it were, after expunging from the record all the prejudiced information of the ancients. Only those ideas which were perceived so clearly and distinctly as to shut out all possibility of the opposite's being true, were deemed worthy of retention under the new method. Among these was the truth of his own personal existence. This truth he considered as so intuitively certain that no honest doubt could for a moment be entertained in its regard, and he made it accordingly the corner stone of the new philosophy. From this sole survivor of the method of doubting everything, he deduced the existence of God and the reality of the outer world. What was let out at the door thus came back through the window, somewhat the worse, in appearance, at least, for the summary manner of its ejection, and the forced, unnatural way by which it was prevailed upon to return. The details of the keen Frenchman's system have long since been disregarded, the corner stone crumbling with the rest of the edifice built upon it. As an articulated body of doctrine, his system has seen its day. But the soul, the spirit of it, has survived the destruction of the body. Descartes' method has become the chief heirloom of modern philosophy.

The Point of View Changes.

The mode of procedure, accepted and followed by secular philosophers since Descartes, is true in the main to the lines laid down by the pioneer Frenchman and afterwards more tightly drawn by Emmanuel Kant. Consciousness is studied first. From the results reached through this preliminary analysis of internal experience, it is decided what answers shall be given to the problems of the world, man, and God. These three great questions no longer occupy the first place either in interest or in treatment. They have, owing to the imperative demands of the new method, dropped to the level of matters of secondary inquiry and importance, dependent altogether for

their scientific solution on the outcome of a previous investigation of the human mind and the conditions under which it works. Modern thought moves outward by expansion so as to envelop or overlap reality rather than inward by compulsion from the reality that lies without. The physical world thus gradually ceased to be regarded as a fact of direct perception, and became an inference, a postulate, a need, an hallucination, or merely a matter of instinctive belief. It is for this reason that some men get no further than the preface in reading the book of Nature.

Unfortunately for the subsequent development of philosophy, Descartes rid himself of the prejudices of the ancients only to add in their stead a new and special prejudice of his own. He overlooked the prejudice lurking and inherent in the peculiar angle of view from which he proposed to work out his scheme of philosophical reform. He selected a purely inner starting-point, which was not in accord with actual experience, because man is a compound of body and soul, and not a disembodied spirit. The judgment, "I think, therefore I am," if made by the intellect alone, and that is how Descartes understood it, contains not a shred of the reality which he thought it tersely expressed. It was a great mistake to conceive the intellect as working apart from sense, instead of with and through it, and intellectualist philosophy has paid dear in our own day for this foolhardy attempt to deprive the senses of their due share in the construction of the idea of reality, or real existence. We should start our system, whatever it be, with man as we find him, a concert of powers, and not a pure intelligence. Sense and intellect work together, not apart, and judgments of existence and reality are joint products of both in unison.

In overlooking the fact that man is a compound of sense and intelligence, Descartes became the advocate of an extreme form of intellectualism which is now receiving hard blows from extremists of an opposite type, the pragmatists. He cut the continuity between thought and its object, took the mind out of its natural setting, and deprived it of all physical background. Worse still, his method created artificial problems which have proved veritable Chinese puzzles baffling all attempts at solution.

An undetected mental bias at the beginning of one's thought is sure to produce more mischief as it trails along, and this was what actually happened with Descartes. Prepossessed, perhaps unconsciously, by the artifices of his own method, he allowed himself to prejudge important, fundamental issues which should not have been thus settled at a stroke beforehand, but left open to investigation and the verdict of unbiassed experience, the only way in the long run by which philosophical issues can be squarely faced and fairly judged.

The Problem of the Bridge.

Chief among the issues thus peremptorily prejudged, and not investigated, as it should have been, was the problem of the relation between mind and matter. Descartes so falsely contrasted these two that they appeared to his thought as completely severed and mutually opposed. The fallacy of separating things that belong together and are found united in concrete human experience, thus raised the most vexing problem in modern philosophy, one which still complacently awaits solution, the problem, namely, of bridging over the assumed chasm between the mental and the physical, the ideal and the real, the world of ideas and the world of things. The history of modern philosophical thought is largely the history of unsuccessful attempts to build a connecting bridge between these two worlds, capable of restoring the communication interrupted by Descartes and declared unsafe by his method.

The theoretical idealists of Germany were the first to attempt the solution of this transit problem. They tried to reason their way across from idea to reality, but never succeeded. The story of their efforts is too long to be told here, and may be deferred to another occasion. These theoretical idealists have latterly fallen into disrepute, and received more than their share of effective modern scorn. Their places are now being taken by the empirical idealists, or pragmatists, the practically minded men of our own day and generation who are trying 'tender' methods where 'tough' ones failed so signally to effect the desired transition. Not unlike the master builders who now use

"re-enforced concrete" for purposes of construction, and no longer trim and fit rebellious stone after the manner of their fathers, these more knowing practicalists first melt the world and make it plastic before they begin to build. Their idea is to fill in the gaps and intervening spaces by a multitude of concrete, particular blocks of information, "conjunctions" Professor James calls them, which will eventually connect thought with reality sufficiently at least for all practical purposes. This most recent attempt at bridge-building seems more like a study in mosaics than anything else we can presently imagine. Its advocates have discharged reason and engaged feeling to superintend the work of construction. Reason, they say, if we accept its plans for guidance, would simply go about the work after the manner of the old stonemason of fifty years ago; it would force upon us the old-fashioned notion that the world is fixed, static, and unyielding. Such a world is too hard to handle. But feeling—once we elect it to the foremanship—turns the hardened world of fact into a molten mass, and allows us to shape reality as we will. In thus setting up a world of purely human make, rooted in immediate impulse, instinct, and feeling rather than in reason and intelligence, the humanist wishes to do away with the independent, self-enclosed empire of pure thought which idealists are so fond of building. Unfortunately, however, the attack on abstract reasoning as such has not stopped there, but gone further, and degenerated into an unworthy onslaught on the use, no less than the abuse, of the human intellect itself.

A Plastic World.

Wonderful things have happened in our day, but none more so than that this hard and crusty old physical world about us, which has so stubbornly resisted for centuries the blandishments of theoretical idealists, should suddenly become soft, melting, and yielding at the suggestion of the empirical idealists who go by the name of humanists and pragmatists. At least, so one portion of the new story runs, though it is not yet told to the last chapter. There are those today who maintain that the whole universe is responsive to the influence of the human will,

and there are those, too, in the common camp of pragmatism who do not go such lengths of admission. It seems a matter of little or no moment to those who believe in the doctrine of universal plasticity, that the extent to which the physical world yields to " psychic treatment " is very slight. Their faith keeps so far ahead of their science in this regard that there seems to be no immediate danger of its being overtaken. One miracle, at least, has been judged worthy of retention—the miracle of feeling. Where the old philosophy of abstract reasoning, so dear to idealists of the transcendental type, stood aghast at the contradictory reports of reality furnished by sense and reason almost in the same breath, the new philosophy of concrete feeling grows rapturous over a miracle in which all contradiction has melted away.

The pragmatists have thus rid themselves of the physical world, which has always stood in the way of idealist philosophers. Nor will they allow an " absolute mind " to take its place. Such a substitution would only repeat the folly of the old idealism, whereas the new philosophy thinks we can all get along better both in thought and action without the interference of absolutes of any kind, spiritual or physical. Some modern Moses has tapped the rock of physical reality with his staff, and lo! it has changed into a flowing psychic stream. "Treat the world, the whole universe in fact, as a thing to be exploited in your own interest, and build your doctrine of reality on a metaphor of cash-values," is the common gospel of the new relativism, whether it affirm at Chicago that the whole universe is plastic to human influence, or deny at Cambridge that it is quite so yielding as all that. The universe is ours, and no other's. We are advised to claim our inheritance at once and assume the management of our own exclusive property.

The Idea of Ownership.

One of the surprises of modern philosophy is to be found in this favorite idea that the world is our personal property. It would be hard to over-estimate the breadth of its influence. For over three centuries philosophy has been almost wholly

written in the posessive case; so much so that at times it gives one the impression of having been drawn up for the most part by retired lawyers who never quite forget their old habits of the bar in cultivating those of the lamp. The property-idea is everywhere conspicuous and prominent; it underlies the theories of knowledge, crops out where we should least expect it, in the unselfish field of religion, and is now being commandeered by the pragmatists to explain the very nature and foundations of reality itself. Philosophy, as is well known, is a very sensitive recorder. It registers the social and industrial ideas of the times in which it is written, and one is not greatly surprised to hear some echoes of the business world even in the philosopher's closet.

But this close sympathy between philosophic thought and social action will not fully account for the strange fact that the philosophers of the day make so much of the ideal of personal possession and so readily fall into the speech of landed gentry. Has the business man at last turned philosopher? Is the "sensitiveness of the market" affecting thought as well as trade? Has the "nation of shop-keepers" finally found a world-view to its suiting? The French seem to think so, judging from recent utterances, but then it may be that they are only renewing acquaintance with an old prejudice instead of fairly describing a new situation. Be this as it may, the property-idea is so ingrained in the very fibre of modern philosophical thought that a recent writer has perhaps not gone too far back for the explanation when he ascribes its origin to the Goths and to the theory of private judgment which came in with the Reformation. Philosophy is obsessed by the idea of ownership. "We find ourselves unable to think save in terms of proprietorship." [1]

How did it come about that human "experience" ever got so completely over from the objective into the possessive case? How did the impersonal question, What? become transformed into the personal question, Whose? Why is it that reality has to be owned by some individual as a piece of personal property

[1] "The Universe as Philosopher," L. P. Jacks, *Hibbert Journal*, Oct. 1907, p. 25.

before it can be called reality? It seems strange that the vast real estate of the physical world, to call it such, must have its title to existence recorded in the mind of some percipient, must become a personal belonging of somebody, before it can be admitted to exist. Knowledge is only one of many relations in which objects are capable of standing. Why is this one relation made so paramount and exclusive that to be real has now no other accepted meaning than to be known, willed, felt, or experienced? With no ear to hear, eye to see, or mind to know, the symphony of the universe would indeed be wasted on the desert air. But even this "infinite waste of beauty" hardly justifies our considering man as both the orchestra and the audience of Nature.

Construction versus Apprehension.

There is, it is true, a very large constructive side to human knowledge, a very large amount of real building activity carried on by the human mind. This significant truth no one acquainted with the facts will dare deny. The mind of man is neither a mirror, nor a camera. No such comparison of it with machines at all represents its nature, or its behaviour in acquiring knowledge. The schoolmen were indeed fond of likening the mind to a mirror, but they were not unaware of the limping, halting character of this figure of speech, and those who read them would do well not to see in this suggestive metaphor a theory of knowledge which is not there at all. It is high time that some one else, besides Sir William Hamilton, should thumb the pages of the schoolmen. The same Sir William seems to have done the reading, and none too well at that, for the whole community of English-speaking critics. One is not prepared to find scholastic philosophers still held up to ridicule as defenders of the theory that the human mind instantly copies or photographs reality. Men were not so benighted as all that even in the ages which it is still the fashion to call dark, to say nothing of contemporary realists who are persistently misreported as advocates of the same gross concep-

tion of the nature of human knowledge. The ease and triumph with which Professor James and his disciples refute the so-called "copyists" nowadays, would lead one to expect that if any of them were around, we should have heard from them before this. There would surely have been some bleating audible of the lambs thus noisily led to the slaughter.

It is true then to say that we actually construct the ideas of an external world, of God, of our own bodily and real selves. But it is only partially true to say so. Before we begin to construct our inner world of thought, we are in the presence of an outer world peopled with objects, and we apprehend reality as something distinct from the ideas we have of it. This apprehension of a something that is not ourselves, is vague at first, a mere outline, as it were, to be slowly filled in and made definite by the subsequent work of reflection, analysis, and comparison. Why is this primary, fundamental, pre-reflective stage of human knowing so completely ignored, so contemptuously disregarded? The objective character of human knowledge is as much entitled to respectful consideration as are the subjective features upon which the thinkers of our day lay an altogether false emphasis. We hope to show later the soundness of the human judgment that reality (something, that is, distinct from anybody's and everybody's ideas of it) exists. To say that such a judgment is an hallucination pure and simple, due either to a blind tendency of the mind to objectify its own data, or to the child's habit of associating sensations with movement and distance, is merely to go behind the returns, a fashion, by the way, much in vogue since Kant's time. Somehow or other, in a way that is hard to understand, recent philosophers know altogether too much of what takes place in the dark room of the human understanding, and too little of what occurs out in the open sunlight of human consciousness. Dark closets seem to have become the favorite haunts of theorists, they speak so much of the skeletons they find there. One might well ask if the danger of illusion is lessened when one thus goes a-groping in the dark.

The Ban on Realism.

It would be far more enlightening to face the unfashionable truth that the knower is related to the things he knows by a relation of real dependence. Was it not Saint Thomas who said that this relation between the knower and the thing known is a dependent relation, real, though not reciprocal?[2] And who for that matter has ever proven the reciprocity of this relation by showing the dependence of things for their reality on the fact that they are known by us and housed in our human consciousness? Why should the knower be changed beyond recognition into an owner or a doer? Why is it that things have always to be accompanied by their owner, leashed, and led about by a string? How did knowledge, in addition to all its other troubles, take upon itself the duty of constituting reality as well as representing it? Is there nothing at all that streams in through the windows of us tabernacles made of clay?

The old Greek conception of the nature of knowledge was that of a faithful reproduction of objects. Kant started the innovation of regarding knowledge as highly moral in its constitution and character; with him it became a practical obligation to be fulfilled. Now comes the American view, superseding its predecessors, and complacently stating that knowledge is by nature a very selfish affair, concerned only with the satisfaction of our personal, practical needs. Three theories of the nature of knowledge thus confront us, the realistic of the Greeks, the moralistic of Kant, and the utilitarian of the pragmatists, the latter contending that knowledge is wholly instrumental in character, an enlightened and useful means of getting along, but not for arriving anywhere in particular; just useful information for persons, but not in any sense an account of what men commonly understand by reality.

One naturally asks at this stage of the inquiry, how did it come about that the real world of objects so totally disappeared from men's thoughts that only a stream of subjective human

[2] Qq. Dd., *De Verit*, q. 1, a. 2, c.

experience now remains to mark the spot where once a world had stood. It is well worth the telling, this story of the departure of modern thought from the old moorings of realism, and its drifting voyage ever since over the shoreless sea of idealism. Will there ever be a return to the ancient place of anchorage? Many signs would seem to indicate that the return journey had already begun, but this is not the place to discuss signs and portents. It is the outward voyage, not the homeward, which interests us just at present. We wish to indicate as briefly as possible how the physical world became gradually submerged in the minds of philosophers until it is now spoken of as a sunken island which our forefathers once knew. Our purpose is so doing is to secure a good perspective in history from which to view the origin of the present tidal wave of pragmatism. It is always good to know the cross-currents of the sea before trusting one's self to the tender mercies of its bosom.

The Real is the Perceptual.

Bishop Berkeley is entitled to the first place of consideration in this rapid survey of sources. He it was who first boldly stated in English thought that so-called reality consisted in our human act of perceiving it rather than in any act of being or existence of its own. Modern philosophy, since the days of the bishop of Cloyne, has persistently regarded reality as somehow reducible to a 'mode of mind.' Even the new school of pragmatists does not propose to check this tendency, but merely to control it, although there are signs, as we said, of a return to realism, to the view that there is something, after all, independent of consciousness. The thought of pragmatists is extremely floating, and their favorite doctrine that reality is change would seem also to apply to their ideas as well. This makes it difficult for a reviewer to report them accurately, for pragmatism seems to one at times, both as to its theory of the world and the personal views of its adherents, pretty much what the common law is said to be, "a wilderness of single instances." But to return to Berkeley.

The bishop of Cloyne was well-intentioned. He thought to offset the materialists and atheists of his day by cutting the material world completely from under their feet, thus depriving them of their favorite source of argument. Accordingly, he reduced matter to a mere sum of perceptions. To be is to be perceived. *Esse est percipi.* Matter consequently exists only in so far as dependent on perceiving mind. This theory that matter is 'perceptual' rather than 'real' is heartily endorsed by the pragmatists of our own day, who look upon Berkeley in consequence as the father of their philosophy of pure experience. But Berkeley's success against the unbeliever was short-lived. Hume soon began to argue on Berkeley's own principles that mind could be reduced to a sum of perceptions just as successfully as matter, and proceeded to formulate the doctrine that mind is the sum of its contents and nothing more.

Mental contents, he argued, are all particular, with not so much as a single, valid universal principle to justify the inference that there is anything "substantial" in our sense-bound human experience, or beyond it, for that matter. Universal ideas are due to the mind's "native propensity to feign" and the world of thought, like the world of things, is only the passing pageant of our own impressions. The substantial "self" was to Hume a wraith of fancy. He assures us that, try as he might, he could never quite succeed in catching "himself" at any time without a perception or observe anything but the perception. The consequence of this line of thought was the complete disappearance of the notion of 'substance.' In its stead we are left with a succession of particular experiences in which so-called 'reality' appears to so-called 'mind.'

The reader will observe that the physical world is already beginning to fade from view. Philosophers will soon be seen casting about for a substitute to replace it, and we shall hear much of these substitutes in the course of later philosophical thought, such as a world of absolute mind, or absolute nescience, a world of absolute matter, or a world of "things-in-themselves" thickly screened off from the vulgar gaze of us poor mortals. Your pragmatist advises strongly against all this world-hunting

tendency of the past. He will not join in this search after "other" worlds; and finds, so he says, one of his chief distinguishing marks in the making of this great refusal. There is for him no world, physical, spiritual, or otherwise, distinct from human experience, much less independent of it. For the pragmatist, the kingdom of this world and the kingdom of heaven are both within us, not outside or beyond at all. His world is altogether and exclusively human, a world of experience with no reality in heaven or on earth to correspond.[3]

The work of reducing mind and matter to the shadowy, unsubstantial order of mere 'appearances' had been carried on by Berkeley and Hume to this alarming extent when Emmanuel Kant appeared upon the scene and resolved to rescue philosophy from the clutches of Hume's scepticism.

The Real is the Right.

This rescue Kant sought to accomplish by framing a theory of knowledge in which the question, What can we really know? would be so definitely answered as to render impossible the future reappearance of scepticism. He accordingly drew attention to the defects in Hume's analysis of mind. It was, first of all, incomplete. Hume, in his efforts to reduce the contents of mind to a mere sum of 'sense-particulars,' had failed to take into proper account the universal elements undeniably present in human thought. These universal elements, such as space, time, necessity, causality, could not be reduced to particular impressions; nor were they, as Hume had said, due to the mind's propensity to feign. To explain them Kant proposed his famous doctrine of the creative character of thought.

The mind is no passive mirror in which things are reflected, but, on the contrary, an active cause coöperating in the production of its own experience. To this special activity of the mind are due the universal forms which our thoughts are accustomed

[3] In a recent article an attempt is made to cut pragmatism clear of all this excessive humanism. *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Nov. 11, 1909, "What Pragmatism is and is not," J. E. Boodin.

to take. It is of the very nature of the mind to anticipate all particular experience by these universal thought-forms, which are, as it were, empty molds of the mind's own making, into which our concrete experience of the world is cast, in such a way as to be completely re-shaped and transformed. So far from being results of experience, therefore, the universal principles of thought are anticipations of experience, and wholly subjective in origin, character, and validity.

Kant set great store by this novel conception of the mind's creativeness. He was fond of likening his discovery to that of Copernicus in the field of astronomy. But Kant's so-called Copernican revolution in philosophy, which consisted in making objects revolve around thought, instead of thought around objects, was not based on a scientific induction as was the theory of the great Polish astronomer. It was a case with him of abstractly prejudging the nature of human experience and of the mind's power to know instead of investigating it, as he should have done. It was clearly an arbitrary assumption on his part that the universal features of human thought are in no sense derived from the mind's reflection on the data furnished by objective experience. Such a view as this could be established only by painstaking proof, and proof of any kind Kant failed to adduce. In fact there is no proof possible of the purely subjective origin of first principles. Even if it were proven down to the hilt that the "categories live subjectively in the very act of knowing," we should still be as far as ever away from having established that these subjective categories do not at the same time express and represent the reality of the thing known.

The presupposition of all knowledge is that thought and its objects are harmoniously related. We live in one world, not two, and yet Kant boldly invented a second world of 'things-in-themselves' lying behind the veil of appearances and utterly inaccessible. He thus cut the mind completely off from its object, took it out of its real context, as it were, and misrepresented its nature and function by this false severance. He was driven to this desperate makeshift by the logic of his own assumptions. When he shifted the centre of the human mind

from a world of objects thought-about to a world of thinking subjects, and transferred necessity from things to thought, he destroyed the conscious, rational, objective evidence of first principles and sank the foundations of knowledge in the inexplorable region of the unconscious. Knowledge became at bottom and at best a matter rooted in subjective impulse, blind belief, unanalyzable faith. There was no longer any conscious rational way of approach left open to the solution of the three great problems of the world, the self, and God, and Kant had to give them up as rationally unsolvable. All three were accordingly marked with the warning sign "no thoroughfare," and but few followers of secular thought have had the hardihood to take any of these three roads since. As a result of assuming this untenable position Kant had to beat a hasty retreat all along the line before Hume. The keen Scotchman of Edinburgh had completely outgeneralled the philosopher of Königsberg. Kant surrendered to him the real physical world and took up the defense of an imaginary universe which has since fallen into the hands of the 'enemy', largely because no one seems to have known its topography but Kant, and the secret died with him.

To save himself, Kant fell back upon a distinction, purely inventive and arbitrary, but thoroughly logical to a man in his position, between reality and appearance, between things "as they are" and things as they "appear to be" to a mind predisposed to regard them distortingly. He was consequently forced to abandon the intellect as a means of reaching substantial reality. The most the intellect could do was to assist in arranging and organizing the disorderly material furnished by the senses. The intellect was of purely domestic habits, according to Kant, and never came in contact with the outer world. None of its principles held good outside, and so it confined itself strictly to affairs of domestic economy within. Kant thus continued to retreat before Hume until he made his final stand against him "in the citadel of the moral conscience," in the famous categorical "Thou shalt" of the moral reason. Here he tried to recover by a new strategy the ground he had given up and lost without so much as striking a blow. By

changing the idea of God from a proposition containing real knowledge to a proposition that merely regulated conduct, Kant tried to rescue from scepticism the substantial reality of God and the soul. The will thus took upon itself the task of establishing what the intellect was deemed powerless to accomplish. The theoretical reason was completely separated from the practical. The mind was divided into two hemispheres, one of 'pure thought,' the other of 'pure will.' In consequence of this illegitimate separation of faculties or functions, that at most should have been simply distinguished, and then left to enjoy their continuity unbroken, reality ceased to be known and began henceforth to be considered rather as willed.

Looking backward to see how much of Kant has been built into the philosophy of pragmatism, one is surprised to find that it is the defects rather than the virtues which have been incorporated. The high ethical sense of the German philosopher is conspicuous by its absence. Pragmatism has as yet laid down no criterion of right and wrong worthy the name of such. But it has retained Kant's false separation of intellect and will, and also his misconception of the function of the intellect as working apart from, rather than with and through, the senses. It is not rare by any means to find in pragmatic writers allusions to the "ideal frames" which the mind furnishes for the orderly tabellation of our promiscuous experiences. Much as pragmatists renounce Kant and all his works, they have nevertheless inherited his spirit to an extent that is surprising when we think of the differences between the formalistic psychology of his day and the concrete psychology of ours. So much may be said in passing.

The Real is the Rational.

The philosopher Hegel, who succeeded, took for his starting point Kant's doctrine of the creative character of thought. But he added to it the idea of evolution or development, and thus contributed to the pragmatism of our own day its central working-principle. By means of this principle Hegel closed up the

gap of severance between subject and object, reality and appearance, which Kant had opened. By affirming the identity of thought and reality, Hegel succeeded in avoiding the tormenting task of constructing a sort of logical cantilever bridge to span the distance which separated subject and object. Agnosticism has recently tried to reopen this gap only to find the neo-Hegelian ever prompt and ready to close it. There is no distinction, so Hegel argued, to be drawn between reality and appearance, as Kant imagined when he tried to regard the 'real' world as a stage hidden from the observer's view by a thick curtain of 'appearances.' Reality is the appearance itself. The more we know about a thing, and the more we see its intimate connection with the system of events to which it belongs, the more real the thing itself becomes for us. The pebble is more real to the geologist who knows it in relation to the history of the past and the science of the present than to the plain man who merely apprehends it as an isolated, unrelated fact of observation.

The 'rational' is, therefore, the 'real,' or what has become known to reason as organically related to all the other items of scientific knowledge. In other words, the 'real' is what has acquired its proper 'place' in the mental world of ordered and organized experience. The unknown is merely what has not yet become 'real' for us. Kant was, therefore, mistaken according to Hegel in regarding the world, the soul, and God, as three intrinsically unknowable entities. We have a real, though still incomplete, knowledge of all three in their respective appearances and manifestations. In so far as they "appear" to mind, they are really known. Absolute reality, says Hegel, is not to be conceived as a static source of being, but as a dynamic process of becoming. Once we recognize that the absolute is not rest or stability, but motion, change, development, the world takes on an appearance calculated to increase rather than to check our aspirations after knowledge. The 'object' becomes the 'idea' itself, and ceases to be a remote and different something which we vainly strive to reach. Exchange opposition for identity, substitute process for inert substance, and we are at once and forever out of the forest of

Kant's abstractions. It is the idea which generates physics, ethics, art, religion, church, state, everything. It is the master-builder, and reality is only another name for the idea progressively realizing itself. Logic is in fact ontology, the processes of thought are the processes of things, and the system of ideas is the system of the world. Reality must, therefore, by our efforts be compelled to manifest itself more and more until the whole becomes thoroughly self-conscious and the race emerges from the present partial eclipse of ignorance into the sunlight of the completely rational and the fully known. Hegel thus wrested the primacy from the will where Kant had located it and restored it again to the intellect. Intellectualism thus regained its respectability only to lose it again by the arrogance of its claims.

It is scarcely possible to over-estimate the amount of suggestive influence which this doctrine of ' mind-in-motion,' the identification of knowledge and reality with the principle of development, has exerted on the modern mind. To be is to be conceived, to become progressively known to reason. Hegel's theory of reality as conceptual was thus a point higher, and we might say in passing, one point further away, than Berkeley's perceptual theory. But Hegel's view has left an indelible impress on the character of subsequent idealism. The study of the genetic relations and connections of ideas has since been regarded by many as equivalent to the exploiting of reality directly in itself. The question of origin has thus assumed, so far as ideas are concerned, a far greater importance than the question of their truth and validity, which is altogether independent of pedigree or lineage. Attempts have been made to rewrite history as if the course of events were reducible to a logical process pure and simple. And now we are witnessing in pragmatism an attempt to rewrite the story of humanity in terms of feeling or pure experience. Pragmatism is Hegelism with Hegel left out. The universe is no longer what it was with Hegel, a stream of thought, but what it has become with James, a stream of experience.

All forms of idealism, since Hegel's time, rest upon the assumption that self-consciousness is so far analogous to, or

identical with, the world of reality that this world itself is opened up to direct human inspection within ourselves, without there being any need of our going "outside." In consciousness, it is said, we no longer sit on the outer rim of the wheel, but stand at the very centre of the universe, listen to the pulse-beats of marching reality, plant our feet firmly on the very foundation-stone of being, and realize that the world has a rational constitution like ourselves. *Homo mensura omnium, ipse non mensuratus.* Hegel's followers of the left wing, as they are called, identified God with the growing experience of the race, and took to the by-path of idealistic pantheism. Those of the right wing, who claim to be in possession of the mind of the master here, do not pursue the analogy of the conscious self so far as identity, but are content to stop at similarity. They refuse to go the length of regarding God as grossly immersed in the flowing stream of human experience. God is, indeed, immanent in the world, but he is also transcendent. Coleridge, Carlyle, Stirling, the brothers Caird, and Thomas Hill Green introduced Hegel's intellectualist views to English readers, and William T. Harris and Professor Royce to American. The latter, substituting potential infinity for actual and combining the method of the pragmatist with that of the rational idealist, conceives men as "bits of the absolute" on the way to perfect self-realization in the Divine. It is this mixture of theoretical with practical elements which Professor James of Harvard vigorously opposes in his efforts to keep his favorite "stream of consciousness" pure and undefiled from such 'rational' contamination. But when all is said, Professor James is merely Hegel in the concrete. Both are inspired by the idea that the world is a perpetual becoming and not a permanent reality at all.

The Real is the Good.

Hegel's extreme intellectualism has meanwhile undergone considerable modification. Modern idealism, under no very great pressure from without, has carried on an extensive move-

ment of reform from within. Schleiermacher made a plea for including the feelings and the emotions in the theory we frame of the universe. Our sense of oneness with the Whole, our passive feeling of dependence on the divine life which is being realized in and through us, counts for far more, he said, in the long run than a merely moral or intellectual world-view. Religion is feeling; thought is a matter of indifference to the real religious sense. It was Hermann Lotze, however, who introduced the most important modification and suggested views which are now in general acceptance among idealists. He insisted on the fact that many things in our experience may be traced to a non-rational source in the feelings and emotions. The intellect, consequently, does not originate, but merely recognizes the presence of these moral and emotional elements in our experience. As a matter of fact, we *feel* that truth, beauty, goodness, and love have a worth and value all their own. Lotze accordingly rejected both the conformist theory that our judgments contain real knowledge of existing things and the theory of Kant that they merely regulate conduct. For knowledge-judgments Lotze substituted judgments of value, worth, personal appreciation. Human judgments register ideas, not reality,—a view which Ritschl afterward pressed into the service of his theory that faith and knowledge reside in two absolutely separate, non-communicating compartments of the mind, where a believing heart is thus enabled to live in peace with an agnostic intellect. This pectoralism of Ritschl, Harnack, and Sabatier, which denies the possibility of acquiring any knowledge of God either by means of reason or revelation, and lays stress on the emotional appreciation of experienced ideals, has been incorporated into pragmatism, especially as regards religion. Hegel furnished the main principle in his doctrine of reality as a perpetual flux. Lotze and Ritschl taught the pragmatist to call the attention of fellow passengers to the enchanting scenery which adorns the banks of the "stream of experience." But it is merely a matter with them of noting details that might otherwise escape observation. We are going nowhere in particular with the pragmatists. The main thing with them is to keep moving.

Lotze believed that much mischief had come to human thought from keeping the intellect isolated from the rest of man's faculties; it is the entire man who judges, not a part. It is our complex personality acting as a powerful whole composed of feeling, will, and thought, which produces these so-called judgments of worth, not our simple reasoning faculty by itself. Hegel, consequently, made a great mistake in regarding the true and the known as first and foremost in our experience. There is a higher category than Truth; it is the good. The 'true' is only a means to the 'good,' subordinate to the latter in every respect. The intellect is a servant, not a master at all. The category of the good is all-inclusive. The function of the intellect is not to analyze, so much as to discover what place a thing occupies in relation to the purposeful scheme of the good which, like a silver strand, runs through all the events of history and of individual life. Idealism thus dropped from the purely rational plane of Hegel to an experimental mode of thought. The category of purpose, finality, was raised to the n^{th} power of significance. The practical began to assume importance in philosophical thought, and the theoretical became relatively of less and less account. There have evidently been a great many changes of government since the intellect lost the presidency and became secretary of the interior. There is no "foreign relations committee" now. It would have nothing to report, according to the humanists.

This deposition of the intellect, this attempt to shift the centre of philosophy from the true to the good recalls an effort in a similar direction made by Scotus and the mystics generally in the thirteenth century, one of whom uttered the soul-cry of his kind when he said that he would rather feel compunction than know its definition. But the difference of attitude between the intellectualist philosophy of St. Thomas and the affective world-view of the mystics in those olden days was in no sense the separatist movement that it is to-day.[4] The difference between these two thinkers was psychological and tempera-

[4] Unde melior est amor Dei quam cognitio; e contrario autem melior est cognitio rerum corporalium quam amor. Simpliciter (absolutely) tamen, intellectus est nobilior quam voluntas."—Sum. Theol., I^a, q. 82, c.

mental rather than logical and separatist. Now, however, the differences amount to a decided aversion to the control of man's interests and ideals by a dominant reason or intelligence. The trend of thought in the nineteenth century is travelling fast towards not only the supremacy of the practical, but the actual separation of it from all theoretical interests, owing in large measure, no doubt, to the reactionary influence of existing social conditions on the formation of mental habits.

Secular philosophers are now centering their efforts, not where Lotze advised, on the purposeful whole, but on the purposeful parts or on individuals solely. The interests of the finite are coming exclusively into the foreground of attention. Idealists and pragmatists alike have set their hearts on framing a philosophy of finite purposes. The realization of personal needs seems now to be regarded as a sufficiently elastic formula in which to rewrite the history and raise the hopes of human kind. We are thus brought face to face with the fact that in its efforts to reform itself from within, modern idealism has followed a sinuous line of descent from the "pure reason" of Hegel to the "pure will" of Kant and Lotze, and thence to the "pure experience" of Professor James which makes reality consist primarily, if not exclusively, in the fact of its being personally felt and willed.

Edmund T. Shanahan.

ELEMENTARY LABORATORY-WORK IN ENGLISH.

Literary laboratory-work as well as chemical embraces Analysis and Synthesis. Phrases, Sentences and Paragraphs are open to as much analysis and worthy of as much study as chemical substances. For, their structure is artistic, their parts are manifold; every word has a history, every phrase has its law of formation, and all sentences can be reduced to a few general types. Literary models and mere vacuities alike spring from the same vocabulary; just as diamonds and charcoal are evolved from the same substance. Language is gross material that can be refined indefinitely and cast into a variety of forms: its possible combinations are numberless, and its shades, iridescent.

If the uninitiated wonder at the patience of the chemical analyst, they have reason to marvel none the less at the painstaking of the student of literature. For, both are drudges; they must work constantly, frequently without interest, at a task that is in itself repellent. In chemistry the student descends through the brilliant surface of things to the dull interior;—through the light of stars, to their material; through the sparkle of a rain-drop, to its molecules; through fair flowers to their elements. It is pleasant enough to view these things from without; but the knowledge is from within. So too nothing is more agreeable to a man of taste than to range over the superb surfaces of literature;—nothing harder than, in the midst of his careering, to pause and force his way downward into the depths. In making this descent he begins to understand that there is a difference between a passing observation of literary beauties and the thorough study of them; that the latter requires an application of mind zealous and constant; and that a considerable effort is required for the mind to overcome the temptation of escaping from the limits of a word or phrase or sentence, so as to wander freely over pages, chapters and even whole books. But with time, as in the case of chemical analysis, concentration displays its bright side; and

in consequence he learns to take more pleasure in getting a few exact notions about a text than in entertaining large but indefinite views about it. Formerly it was wide readings that gratified his natural bent; but now he stops to trace a word to its beginnings. He used to swallow books; but now he pauses to masticate the smallest sentences. At first it was the matter of his readings; but now it is the form. He has conceived a kind of affection for words, and fondles sentences.

In the literary analysis of models the following four ingredients reveal themselves to any moderately studious reader: Imagination, Individuality, Signs of Large Reading, and Love of Technicalities.

First then it may be observed how these authors generally hit upon a subject that lends itself to imaginative work. Accordingly the pages of our classics glow with color and sparkle with brilliant expression. It is a hidden color at first glance like the iridescence of a braid of hair in the sunshine: but just as the revelation of the glories of diffraction grows and grows, on closer inspection, into a fairy field of rainbow-hues, so a page of De Quincy or of Hawthorne, tedious in the beginning, becomes bearable, grows interesting, invites a second reading and a third and fourth, unveils new beauties momentarily, until in the end we feel something of the author's own enthusiastic love of imaginative expression. If his genius had missed and led him to the treatment of some dry topic, all his powers of illustration would have been benumbed, his words would have risen slowly without the flush of spontaneity and his sentences would lack their winning grace. The result would have been a catalogue of facts instead of a narration; an enumeration of particulars instead of a living description; or a dead level of language instead of the undulating surfaces of literature.

Secondly, Individuality or the personal element always figures conspicuously in their works. They either draw their thoughts from within, or, in case they touch upon something external to themselves, that object is first bathed in the light of their imagination and warmed by contact with their sentiments. They love their thoughts and cherish their subject;

it is sunshine to them—even a part of their being: in moments of retirement it lives and breathes in them; and in company it manifests itself not unfrequently, coloring their conversation and laying its impress upon their conduct in general. The expression of it is more a pleasure than a task; and if at times their pen balks and the ink seems to coagulate along with their thoughts, they are favored afterwards with new lights and unaccustomed richness of expression. It is not so much the facts they tell, that makes their composition literary; not so much the views expressed in their essays; nor the incidents narrated in their tales, as the radiations of their personal magnetism. The same facts might be told by another with poor effect; the same views uttered and pass unnoticed; the same incidents penned, and bore a patient reader.

This personal element supposes independence and initiative in judging things. It is not always the safest mental attitude to take; but without it, individual outlines are sure to be merged into surrounding generalities.

It supposes too, more or less peculiarity of character. For, just as ordinary views are the product of ordinary minds, so, by way of contrast, in most instances originality can be traced to some idiosyncrasy in mental or moral make-up. In point of fact the generality of literatures have displayed a degree of freakishness in social intercourse quite as repellant as their compositions are winning. It would seem that eccentric tendencies in every-day life are the parents of literary beauties. If you think in a common-sense way you are too dull to read. It is the unusual and the unexpected that procures an appreciative perusal. Would it be too much to say that the literary world is largely a world of oddities? Coleridge and De Quincy were opium fiends and derived much of their inspiration from the drug. Southey was accustomed to burn his day's work regularly. Wordsworth used to cut the leaves of borrowed books with a greasy butter-knife; and looked upon himself as Shakespeare's equal. Keats died of the pain of a harsh criticism. And Shelley was at war with universal Christian sentiments. Swift was a madman, Steele a vagabond, Marlowe, a brawler; Goldsmith, a fop; Johnson, the

impersonation of egotism; Ruskin, an enthusiast; Collins, a lunatic; and Carlyle very nearly one. These were peculiar men, as are a good many of their followers of the present day; and so the conclusion is forced upon us with a considerable degree of probability, that ordinarily it requires peculiar men to attain to marked success in literature.

Though our writers were espoused to their own opinions and engrossed in their own sentiments, nevertheless, without loss to their originality, they had become familiar with the choicest authors that had preceded them. One would imagine them careful not to admit into their own views any foreign element, nor into their personal feelings, influences from without. But it was quite otherwise. All the color of the richest poetry had fallen across their imagination, and all the pathos, exhilaration and enthusiasm of former bards had mingled with their own hearts' emotions. They had revelled in the wealth of prose composition that flowed down from older sources and had made the authors' names household words. Eminently men of books, they had followed with intensest interest every glowing romance-tale in prose and poetry; had studied out the choicest essays; had looked into orations of the past, and even essayed the metaphysics of the higher-minded. Their study was their paradise, and their books were their bowers, between the pasteboard walls of which they passed their happiest moments. Every word they read was a toothsome morsel and every sentence a delicious repast. Page succeeded page like the courses of a feast, and when the end had come their appetite was still a keen desire. They devoted themselves even to the ancient and modern languages, to enjoy their rich contents. Their works are redolent with the good odor of their predecessors and sprinkled with quotations from their works. They had their favorites and worked according to models. Sometimes together with their beauties they copied their mannerisms and even their glaring faults. Newman, Macaulay, Ruskin, and the rest needed some sympathetic force to draw their powers into motion; some fire to light their own enthusiasm; some written thought to enable them to throw their own into language. Had they not read, maybe they never would have written: for, one

needs to see a printed page before he feels disposed to fill his own. Ruskin in Queen's Gardens sets great value on good books; Johnson admits his debt to Addison, Newman fed on Cicero; Virgil drew from Homer, and it would seem that Tennyson looked into Marlowe. These men did not read to gather facts, to learn words and copy sentence-forms, so much as to catch the spirit of the writer and fuse it with their own.

Finally their love of technicalities and care for minutiae! This trait stands out in striking contrast with their Imagination, Individuality, and Wide Reading: for, a technical mind is calculating; an imaginative, individual and reading mind, is instinctive; the one inclines to the closest study; the other works in accord with natural taste.

These technicalities especially regard words and sentences. It may seem strange at first sight that a man like Macaulay who handled important political questions should trouble himself about the smoothness of his sentences: or that a philosophic mind like Carlyle should look to rhetoric: or that Burke who swayed the destiny of the English nation should study literary expression. But their great intellects were not too great for such trivialities. They appreciated the pleasing effect that the merest touches sometimes cause. Tennnyson is credited with saying that he smoked a box of cigars over the composition of four lines of "The Brook;" and every college boy has heard of the years spent by the poet Gray in perfecting the expressions of his "Elegy." It is evident from the military proclamations of Napoleon Bonaparte that he had learned to soften his iron hand to the gentle work of the pen.

With literary men the use of words is more an instinct than a study. Variety, exactness and suggestiveness characterize their vocabulary. Variety is necessary because of the stationary character of their thought. They do not pass from idea to idea directly; but instead, on account of the imaginative digressions and sentimental side-lights bearing on their particular cast of mind, they circle around the matter in hand and view it from various points. Now it would pall on the reader to observe the identical word repeated over and over again for the same thought. For, though unity of thought pleases, one-

ness of expression does not. Any descriptive page of real value is evidence of the command of words which the authors had. This command is not a bare-bone dictionary knowledge, but the flower and fruit without, of their own warm thoughts within. Words are chosen with such unerring genius that, though perfect synonyms at times, they cannot change places without detriment to the general effect. They simply grow out of the thought like flowers from a stem, and must be left alone. They are still warm with the writer's imagination, and still pulsate with his intellectual vitality. They contain the talismanic power of conjuring up before others a whole field of ideas, and suggesting details without number. It sometimes happens that a whole trend of reflections aroused in a reader's mind and wrought into an elaborate composition can be traced back to pregnant words of this kind.

It cannot escape an attentive reader that our writers shaped their sentences with an artist's loving care. They threw their thoughts into a series of sentence-forms like liquid metal in casts; so that all the variety which delights us now in their pages was not the rich, spontaneous out-pouring of their minds, imagination and heart; but the result of calculating foresight. They knew that an accumulation of periods palls; that a succession of short, crisp sentences suggest a flippant writer; that too many loose ones deaden the effect and that a partiality for balance in literary construction is synonymous with a formal spirit. They saw, on the other hand, that each kind has its advantages and that their separate graces, if used moderately and if combined happily like the parts of a song, would produce a complete harmony of sound. We may justly suppose that they practised each species in turn until they became so familiar with all of them, that no heat of imagination nor activity of feeling, however intense, could withdraw them from these forms. For, it should not seem more strange for writers to go to these lengths than for singers to do so. May it not be ventured that, in writing, too much is sometimes left to chance? What singer would think of trusting to the inspiration of the moment and to the chance of rendering his song correctly at the appointed time? A page of good prose contains as much

harmony—as many variations in sound, as many sweet trills and inspiring cadences as a page of music: and it requires as much labor to compose the one as the other. Literary order and variety cannot rise out of a chaos of words any more than cosmic order and variety out of material confusion. The grand proportions of the periodic construction had been measured in the author's mind and adopted as his model. The vivacious movement of the crisp style had caused his imagination to vibrate in accord with it: and the graces of antithesis had insinuated themselves into his intellectual make-up as a preparation for the work of the pen in which he was afterwards to engage.

Imagination, Individuality, Large Reading, the Love of words and sentences—these are elements which an attentive reader discovers to be largely the constitution of the best writers. Without the imagination and the personal influence, the technical study of vocabularies and of sentence-structure would have made them pedants. Reading, taken by itself, would have dissipated their powers; and if their Imagination and Feelings had not been kept within bounds by chastening study they would have become dreamers. It does not require much insight to see all this in general. But to understand it in detail is no less a study than the analytic work of the Chemical Laboratory.

Literary laboratory work, besides the analysis of authors, embraces the Synthetic method, or in plain terms, Composition. This is evident: for we do not read for the mere purpose of enjoyment nor merely to learn; but also to introduce into our style the commendable qualities of a model. Composition is more difficult than analytic study, just as building is more difficult than tearing down.

And first of all, it is no easy task to train the Imagination. Imagination is naturally unsettled; it must be taught to act equably. It is hot and fiery; it must be cooled to a gentle warmth. It is independent; it must be made to serve the purpose of illustrating thought. On the one hand it must not be left to its own disposal, for fear of extravagance; nor on the other, straightened by over-study, for fear of undoing it. The

habit of thinking out something for one's self will develop this faculty wonderfully. We must look at things with our own eyes if we wish to be imaginative. We must try to see the color and configuration of objects and for every thought supply a living image in the imagination. The same means tend not only to the cultivation of Imagination; but to the acquisition and perfection of an Individuality as well. Finally it will not be hard to read; but the study of words and sentences will offer difficulty enough.

Without developing the subject of our personal synthetic work in English we will go a step further. The literary laboratory work of the class-room is next in order. Here again Analysis and Synthesis play their part.

In analysing, it will be profitable to show the students, just as we formerly discovered for ourselves, how imaginative thought, personal views, wide reading and the study of words and sentences are prime factors in the make-up of our representative authors.

After this we can employ the synthetic method of transferring these elements in part, from the model to the learner's mind. Imagination and Individuality offer the greatest difficulty for the following reason. The study of the languages and mathematics ordinarily tend more directly to the improvement of the prosaic faculties and beget a common-sense cast of mind which is not easily ruffled by the breath of fancy nor open to the influences of sentiment or imagery. As the young mind solidifies in its strength it naturally becomes less impressionable unless counter-influences are called into action. Declensions, conjugations and rules; themes, parsing and translations of plain texts, whether Latin or Greek, absorb so much attention that no inclination nor power is left to arouse the forces of the pictorial faculty. A straight-forward character is the result; a clear mind without a trace of color in it. Under the stress of this bent in the direction of a substantial mental development, it will be doubly hard to impress on the mind lighter touches and supererogatory flourishes. Boys, so trained, become adepts in the analytic work of extracting the perfections of others' thoughts, but find it almost impossible to formulate ideas

of their own and express them attractively. The exhaustive explanations of texts which are required of them leave them little time to evolve anything out of their own mental being. Besides, it is the natural bent of many professors in the High School Course to corral young minds into the pages of a book and treat them to the intellectual herbage there instead of occasionally permitting them free rein to explore and enjoy the rich wide tracts of Imaginative musing. Students ought to be thrown back on their own resources and told to draw on their own fund. It will not do to train them into the ways of habitual borrowers. Predigested ideas help them little. They should be put in the way of scenes and subjects with which they are familiar. Now, early in life, sensations, especially of sight and hearing, appeal most strongly to them. Hence, scenes in which there is plenty of color and sound occupy the first place. It is essential that these scenes be not commonplace. For, it is characteristic of Imagination to be chameleon-like in reference to subject-matter. Moreover if the color is to be intense and if the impression of it on the reader's mind is likewise to be intense, the range of vision ought to be narrowed as much as possible. In a literary sense, no less than in the field of physics, Intensity and Extension or Amplitude may be said to vary inversely with each other. A whole story should not be insisted on, nor a whole series of scenes, nor—as some of us may have told the boys—"so many pages of foolscap." Let it be a simple thought, a single scene, one incident, a few sentences, a mere paragraph. Let them inclose in that limited space their observations, in the choicest language. It ought to be a matter of words and sentences rather than of pages;—at least until puerile simplicity has become sophisticated. Their minds are capable of but swallow-flights of thought until their wings be strengthened enough by long practice to execute a sustained passage, eagle-like. A concentration of their attention upon words and sentences will be the result of this narrowing down. They will reflect, compare and choose with taste and correctness; so that, in the end, a literary character will be born and nurtured in them. "Our Street at dusk," for example, would afford matter for a neat paragraph. "A Railroad Station at

Train-time" is a scene of engaging interest. "A Walk through the Woods," "On the Lake," "Sunrise," "The Sky at Night," "A Comfortable Homestead," "Under an Umbrella," "Pope Pius X," "A Snow-Storm," "Scenes from a Steeple," "The Ocean" and such-like diversified topics, for the most part descriptive and familiar, could be made the substrata of some interesting paragraphs for the High School Classes. It must be something which will naturally lead their minds through pleasant paths. They should be carried along by the subject, not driven to develop it. They should be told to form a distinct picture before they put pen to paper. Let it be a small picture; it matters not, so long as it is clear-cut and highly colored. Imagination is not long-lived. Accordingly its task should be brief though intense. Finally the little thoughts which we suggest, had better not be taken second hand from a reference-book; because paper-thoughts have lost the blush and vivacity of their first being. But they should be the outgrowth of our own meditations; for then they will possess that freshness which will make them acceptable, that suggestive power which will be productive of new ideas, that warmth and color which will excite sympathetic influences in the student's heart.

So much for Imagination and Individuality in the Synthetic Laboratory Work of the Class-room. Reading follows in order.

Castlemon, Henty and authors like them should be replaced by writers of true literary caliber. Scott and Dickens are the old reliables. Add to these, individual works of the style of Fabiola, The Lion of Flanders, Ben Hur, Dion and the Sibyls, Robinson Crusoe, and The Last Days of Pompeii. The class as a whole ought to be made to read these. Make them matter for examination. This can be done successfully with a little scheming. To avoid the objection of an insufficient supply of these particular books in the library, the class might be divided into two parts: to one-half of them Dickens might be assigned, and to the other half Scott. A certain number of these classics,—say four or five at least—should be read by every boy in the space of two months. They may read more if they wish, even of other authors; but these four or five ought to be of obligation. To keep the students to this duty it will be suffi-

cient to require of them at the expiration of the allotted time a written account of one of the books which they have read, the choice of the particular book for treatment being left to the professor. The average for rewards shall depend on these two items: 1st. the quantity of Reading; 2nd. the quality of the account.

The purpose of such general unscientific reading is to eradicate from the youthful mind an immoderate tendency towards sensational fiction and to introduce it to novelists of acknowledged literary ascendency. This company will have a refining influence on the wild make-up of a boy and accustom him to the more rarified atmosphere of an intellectual life. He learns to live in books instead of on the street; he is trained to love pages of words as well as the play-grounds: and it must be acknowledged that though his readings may be quite careless, there will a considerable advance in his mental cultivation notwithstanding. Scott leads him through a series of highly-colored scenes, displays a galaxy of Romance characters, multiplies deeds of arms and love, introduces him into the secrets of maid and knight, and arrays their conversation in all the bold terms or gentle persuasiveness of olden days. Dickens has built up another world for youthful readers. It is altogether different from the romance-bard's; but quite as interesting: its coloring is not as deep, and its scenes are less brilliant; but his novels touch the heart; more gently because more naturally. It seems that these works are taken up too late in the course. Later on, the student is expected to read poetry, prose-essays and speeches; and if he lives up to this obligation the chances are that he will have little time for the studious reading of fiction. It is, besides, almost a hopeless task to spend oneself in trying to teach scholars to write unless they have first read. The class-room work is the frame work, which must be covered and adorned by their own personal reading. Fluency is an impossibility without reading. Words drawn from other sources than classical authors;—even from the best dictionaries—will lack the real literary tinge, and will show that deficiency when employed in Composition. On the other hand, a teacher recognizes immediately, on examining a set of papers, which boys

are acquainted with the best novels, and which are not. Finally, lest disgust result, the student should not be forced to study these works, so much as merely to read them.

But there is a studious reading to which they ought to be systematically subjected. A certain author, like Washington Irving or Hawthorne, should be employed as a Class-book. Every boy is to have a copy of some choice work—*e. g.,* Twice Told Tales or The Sketch Book. To enrich their vocabulary, have them arrange four columns on a sheet of paper; filling the first with nouns, the second with adjectives, the third with verbs, and the fourth with adverbs taken from a paragraph of moderate length. Memory is aided by the very act of such a segregation. Or secondarily bid them notice all the synonyms on a page of description. Or, put them to work looking up synonyms for a set number of words, note-book in hand. Or show them how to reshape a paragraph by the substitution of synonyms. Or, instead of single words, have them place equivalent phrases; and vice versa.

From words we pass to phrases and sentences. A copy of choice phrases might be made; or new ones might be formulated on the matter in hand. Or the tasty constructions of the author might be converted into plain language, so as to make the student appreciate better, by the contrast, the elaborate refinement of his model.

We should insist from the beginning on the three or four varieties of sentences. The danger to which tyros are exposed in the formation of the periodic is a want of contour. They are liable to accumulate a number of subordinate sentences without regard for balance. They heap up, without arranging; they construct a stone-pile, but not a stone house. It would be well to insist on their introducing into the paragraphs which they write by way of imitation, the various kinds of sentence-forms without exception:—periodic, crisp, antithetical and loose. This should be done constantly even at the risk of becoming too formal. Every day in class a paragraph may be carefully read to them whilst they are giving their closest attention. After this bid them reproduce the paragraph as well as they are able. Some of the original will remain in their

memory, and by being committed to paper will be in a fair way to become part of their own vocabulary.

This is in brief a system of literary laboratory work. It supposes that the professor shall first analyse model-authors and reproduce their qualities in his own composition; and that then he shall lead his class to do the same.

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THE IRISH COLLEGE IN PARIS (1578-1908).

Its History, and its Work in Three Centuries.

Institutions which form a link with the distant past have an interest of their own for the student of the history of education. Such a one is the Irish College in Paris, founded more than three centuries ago, and incorporated in the ancient University of Paris.

The purpose of the present paper is to sketch its growth, its organization, its life and the work that it has accomplished.

ORIGIN AND GROWTH.

In the year 1578 John Lee, an Irish priest who had suffered imprisonment for the faith, came to Paris with six companions. To complete their studies they entered the Collège Montaigu, an establishment famous for the brilliancy of its students, and no less famous for its regimen, which was so severe that Rabelais, in his Gargantua, declared that "if he were king of Paris, he would set fire to the College, and burn the Principal and staff."

In due time Father Lee became attached to the church of St. Severin, a church which still exists, and whose artistic beauties Huysmans has made famous. But zealous though he was in the discharge of his duties, he did not forget his fellow-countrymen, who flocked to Paris to seek education denied them at home. He provided for them an humble residence, and placed over it Dr. Thomas Dease. In 1605 he found a generous coöperator in the person of John de l'Escalopier, President of the Parliament of Paris, who provided the Irish students with a more commodious residence, and liberally supplied all their wants. In 1621 Dr. Dease was promoted to the see of Meath, and his place, as rector of the College, was taken by Mgr. Thomas Messingham, Protonotary Apostolic. Under the administration of this learned and distinguished man, the Irish priests and students obtained from Louis XIII, in 1623 the rights of a corporation. In 1625 the College was incorporated in the University of Paris and in the

following year its rules of discipline were canonically approved by the archbishop of Paris. Messingham's College was open to ecclesiastics from all parts of Ireland. But it was unable to contain all who sought admission. In 1638 there was a colony of Irish in the old College de Boncour, an annex of the College of Navarre; and many Irish priests still continued to frequent the College Montaigu. At various times the erection of a more spacious college was under consideration, and in 1672 the Bishops of Ireland deputed Dr. John Molony II of Killaloe to treat with Colbert on the subject. At this time two Irish ecclesiastics were resident in Paris, Dr. Malachy Kelly, one of the chaplains of Louis XIV, and Dr. Patrick Maginne, formerly chaplain to Queen Catherine, wife of Charles II of England. These two eminent men obtained for their fellow countrymen the ancient *Collège des Lombards*. The Lombard College or St. Mary's, as it was styled, had been founded in 1334 for students from Lombardy. It had long enjoyed a considerable reputation in the University. According to the historians of Paris, it had given hospitality to Ignatius of Loyola when he came first to Paris, until he entered the College of *Ste Barbe*. Here too Francis Xavier was entertained, and here the first Fathers of the Society are said to have resided until they entered on possession of the celebrated College subsequently known as Louis-le-Grand.

The endowments of the Lombard College consisted of eleven small bursaries, and to these, eleven Irish priests were nominated. Dr. Kelly and Dr. Maginne rebuilt the college from its foundations at their own expense, and were appointed its first Provisors. The abbé William Bailly, a French ecclesiastic, aided them in the work they had undertaken, and out of his own resources paid the expenses of forty students. In 1699 the Pope sent a subsidy to the Irish exiles in Paris, and amongst them to the students at the Lombard College. On their behalf, too, the immortal Bourdaloue[1] raised his eloquent voice, and his sermon for a seminary preached to an assembly of ladies of rank is a glowing tribute to the virtues of the Irish students preparing in exile and in poverty for a difficult and dangerous mission at home. The course of years

[1] *Bourdaloue*: Deuxième exhortation pour un Seminaire.

brought new benefactors. Nine Irish bishops, thirty-two Irish priests, some officers and doctors, and pious ladies of Irish race and name, made foundations for the education of ecclesiastical students. Before the close of the eighteenth century the College possessed an endowment amounting in value to about 150,000 francs or £6,000 a year.

The number of students too went on increasing. As soon as there was sufficient accommodation the students resident in Messingham's College and elsewhere in Paris, were gathered together in the *Collège des Lombards*. In 1730 the number was eighty. In 1736 it was one hundred; and in 1764 it had risen to one hundred and sixty-five. The existing buildings were no longer sufficient, and in 1769 a plot of ground was purchased, and a new College built to which the junior students, to the number of sixty, were transferred. The two Colleges, which were in fact but two divisions of the same establishment, continued their peaceful work until 1792. When the Revolution had spent its force and order was restored, the College was reopened in 1805 with the sanction of Napoleon I, and the blessing of Pius VII. The older *Collège des Lombards* ceased to be a house of residence and the premises, 5 rue des Irlandais, became the sole Irish College. Its resources, however, were reduced to one-third of their value. The good work resumed in 1805 has since gone on, with but a short interruption during the siege of Paris in 1870–71, and now in 1908 after more than three centuries of existence the College still lives 'doomed indeed to death,' but let us hope, 'fated not to die.'

II.

ORGANIZATION OF THE COLLEGE.

Such was the origin and growth of the College. What was its organization? As an ecclesiastical establishment the College was in the seventeenth century subject to the archbishop of Paris who as local ordinary, appointed the Rector, and enjoyed the right of visitation. As an educational institution it was subject to the University of Paris, which consented to its establishment, on condition that the Rector and students should promise, on oath,

obedience to the laws of the University and should submit to the supervision of two doctors of the Faculty of Theology. The course of studies extended over five years, namely two years in philosophy, and three years and six months in theology. It was provided, however, that students whose talents were practical rather than speculative, should omit the philosophy course, and pass at once to the study of moral theology and scripture, for two years and a half, after which they should be sent back to the Mission in Ireland. The students attended the University classes. But, within the College there were repetitions in theology and philosophy. On Sundays they assisted at a sermon in one of the public churches of the city. In the 17th century their usual rendezvous on Sunday was the chapel of the College des Bons-Enfants of which Vincent de Paul, who was always their benefactor, was principal. The rules of discipline were strictly ecclesiastical, and it is interesting to note that before St. Vincent de Paul or Mr. Olier had commenced their great work for the reformation of clerical education in France, the Irish College in Paris and its sister Irish College at Bordeaux, were fully organized ecclesiastical seminaries.

With the acqusition of the *Collège des Lombards* a more complex system of organization began. The College was still subject to the archbishop of Paris, and to the Rector of the University, both of whom possessed and exercised the right of visitation. But it was governed no longer by one superior, but by two Provisors appointed in the first instance for life. On the death of the first Provisors it was deemed expedient to increase their number to four, who should be Irish priests, chosen by election, one from each province of Ireland. The electors were the students of college, including priests, and students in Theology and Philosophy. The election over, the archbishop of Paris nominated one of the Provisors to be Principal, another, Prefect of the clerics, a third, chaplain, and a fourth, Treasurer. The Provisors held office for three years; but with the sanction of the archbishop they might be re-elected for a second, and even for a third term. The elective system existed in all the Irish Colleges in France. It proved to be the source of agitation and division and in the end it was found necessary to abolish it. The course of studies extended over a period of six

years, namely two years in philosophy and four in theology. The fourth year was specially devoted to the study of Ritual, the composition of sermons and preparation for pastoral work. Students of promise were permitted to present themselves at the end of the third year's theology for the degree of Bachelor, and if successful they were authorized to remain two additional years in preparation for the Licentiate. On the completion of their studies, they were obliged, under pain of suspension from the celebration of Mass to return to Ireland, unless their bishops consented to their remaining longer in France. Within the College the discipline was purely ecclesiastical and it is not unworthy of note, that each student was required to have in his possession a copy of the Bible and to read a chapter of it every day.

When the Revolution came, the ancient university of Paris perished. In 1808 the University of France took its place. But the Sacred Faculty of Paris was gone for ever. Rome never recognized the Theological Faculty of the Napoleonic University. When the Irish College, therefore, was reorganized, after the Revolution, it retained its legal status as a Corporation, but it became a *Collège Libre* no longer subject to the University. Classes of Rhetoric, of Natural and Mental Philosophy and of Theology were established within the College. The Rector and professors were presented by the four archbishops of Ireland, and appointed by the Minister of the Interior until 1832, and since that date by the Minister of Public Instruction. In 1858, just fifty years ago, the Bishops of Ireland, with the approval of the S. C. of Propaganda, confided the entire direction of the College to the Irish Vincentians, who have been aided, from time to time, by secular priests, such as Dr. Thomas Mac-Hale, Dr. Logue, Dean Kinane, and others.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the superior, or Provisors of the College were the administrators of the College property, subject to the local ordinary. In the first half of the nineteenth century the superior possessed the same right, subject however to the control of the Minister of the Interior, or to that of the Minister of Education ; in 1850 a French administrator was appointed, and in 1873 the administrator was replaced by a *Bureau gratuit,* or Board, consisting of seven members, of

whom two only are ecclesiastics, one being the rector of the College, who is the only Irish member of the Board.

III.

LIFE AND REPUTATION OF THE STUDENTS.

But it will be asked, whence were the students recruited? What was their manner of life, what was the reputation they enjoyed and the success which they achieved in the schools? The students came from all the Provinces of Ireland. In those days the journey to Paris was no excursion for pleasure. It was attended with much hardship and many dangers. First of all, it was by law a crime to leave the kingdom to receive Catholic education, and parents who sent their children abroad for that purpose were exposed to the rigors of the penal code. Hence students left Ireland with much secrecy, and in many cases sailed in vessels bound for France, under the title of merchant's clerks. Nor was the journey to and from the continent devoid of incident. In 1752 when Patrick Joseph Plunket set out for Paris he travelled as articled to a Dublin merchant, and in 1779 when he left the Irish College to return to Ireland as bishop of Meath the vessel in which he sailed was captured by the famous privateer Paul Jones. The bishop's books and papers were seized, but on the petition of the superior of the College they were eventually restored to him through the good offices of Franklin then representative in Paris of the United States. Many other incidents of such journeys are recorded. Thomas Lewis O'Beirne, subsequently a pervert, and a protestant bishop, when coming to Paris made the journey from Holyhead to London on foot. Father Peter O'Neil, in memory of whose fortitude under persecution a statue has recently been erected in Youghal, was waylaid as he passed through the Bois de Boulogne on his journey to the College, but armed with a shillelagh he quickly put his assailants to flight. But perhaps the fullest account of the incidents of the journey is found in an extract from the diary of Dr. Charles O'Donnell, Bishop of Derry. Charles O'Donnell already in priest's orders set out for Paris in July 1777. The extract runs

thus: "July 1777: Invoice of things put into my saddle-bags at the Rev. Dr. McDavitte's house near Strabane.—9 shirts of fine linen, marked C. D.; 6 ditto of coarse kind, 8 sheets, 9 pair of stockings, 2 pair of breeches, 2 flannel waistcoats, 1 French grammar, 2 Irish hymnbooks, 2 pocket-handkerchiefs, 6 pair of ruffled sleeves.

"Left Strabane July 8th, slept that night at Widdow Duggan's; second night at Castleblaney. Third day rode to Drogheda, stayed there two nights. Supped and took breakfast with the ladies of the nunnery. Became acquainted with Father Burrell, and some gentlemen besides. Fourth day of my journey went to Dublin on the stage coach, stayed there two nights. Took the packet boat for Liverpool at five o'clock afternoon. Had a pleasant view of the country going down the Liffey, the Hill of Howth to the left hand, the Wicklow Mountains to the right, which we had in view next morning, likewise Holyhead; sailed down the Welsh coast, and arrived at Liverpool on the 16th at 8 p. m. Took a slight view of the docks, which were well supplied with ships, saw also the floodgates, drawbridges, with some other curiosities. The most pleasing view was from the Exchange, from which the whole town could be seen. That evening, (the next we presume after his arrival) I took my seat in the Liverpool Fly, and set out for London at five o'clock. Drove all night. Dined at Lichfield, about 100 miles from Liverpool. A country village, not very large, but remarkable for an ancient church adorned with three spires, and a great many pictures of saints, and other religious people as they seemed to me to be, set up in places outside the church all made for them.

"Supped that night at Meridon, about thirty miles off. Went by Coventry, St. Albans, and Highgate. From thence to London, where I arrived at eight o'clock p. m. on the 19th day of the month. Stayed two nights, having heard Mass in Lincoln Field chapel. Saw the royal apartments in the King's palace. Took an outside passage on the Dover stage, being anxious to see the country. Went out by the Queen's Head Inn, eight miles from London, to Rochester, a long narrow town, with but few streets, having the Thames running through the middle. From thence to Canterbury twenty-five miles, to Dover fifteen miles;

seventy-three miles from London to Dover. The country seemed very productive, beans, wheat and hops, no flax or potatoes, but great quantities of brush or wood. That day the rain fell prodigiously. We had little pleasure on the journey, but very wet skins for our curiosity. That night we slept at Dover. Entered the College of the Lombards on 26th July, 1777." [2]

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries most of the students who came to Paris were already in priests' orders. They had been ordained in Ireland as soon as they had acquired a sufficient mastery of Latin to enable them to read intelligently the Breviary and the Missal. It was a singular practice, but the Mass stipends of the young priests helped to defray the expense of their education, and this was the ground on which it was justified. In 1764 this practice is referred to in a resolution of the Cathedral chapter of Armagh: "We see with concern, my Lord, that two of the three ordained last year have remained at home from their studies, to the great loss of not having in proper time a sufficient supply for the Diocese, and contrary also to your Grace's positive directions to them. We therefore recommend to your Grace (in order to hinder yet like inconveniences for the future), to direct an order to be given to every young priest, along with his letters of ordination and Exeat, a suspension from saying Mass in Ireland to be incurred, ipso facto, after so many days, weeks or months, as your Grace will judge it convenient to appoint for their leaving the kingdom; and we further request of your Grace to discourage any priest or Community boy, that will return to this diocese except in case of sickness, and that properly attested, before he finishes his regular course; and has proper attestation of his good behaviour from the Superiors; and that if any should so return, to oblige him to go back again without any benefice or other promotion." [3]

But though the majority of the students were already priests, there was a junior section in the College. The juniors usually entered in the class of *troisième*. From the Humanities they

[2] Brief memoirs of the Bishops of Derry, by Rev. James McLaughlin, P. P., pp. 63, 64.

[3] *Collections on Irish Church History*, by Rev. Lawrence Renehan, D. D., p. 108.

passed on to Philosophy and Theology. A wing of the Lombard College was set apart for them, and when their number had increased, it was for their use the buildings of the actual College were constructed. Some of the juniors finding that they had no vocation for the church, left the College and found a field for their talents in business, in medicine, or in the ranks of the Irish Brigade. Those who persevered in their vocation having received a more complete literary formation became more distinguished in the schools, than those who began their studies later in life.[4]

On their arrival at the College the students, whether Juniors or priests, found themselves amongst their countrymen. A home was provided for them, to protect them against the dangers prevalent in a great city. But their appointments cannot have been luxurious. The priests who lived by means of their Mass stipends settled their account every week. When there were bursaries, the revenue of them usually amounted to no more than four hundred francs a year, and for that sum the College was obliged to board and clothe the students and provide them with books and medicine for the entire year.

As has been already observed the students attended the University classes. For Philosophy the priests frequented the College des Grassins, and the Juniors that of Plessis, celebrated for the excellence of its classical department. For Theology they attended either the Sorbonne, or the College of Navarre, where their countryman Dr. Michael Moore had been principal, and where several Irishmen like Dr. Plunket and Dr. Flood were Royal professors of Theology. But what was the success they attained in the schools and what was the reputation they enjoyed in the French capital?

The dialectic skill of the Irish was the theme of many pens. Lesage in his *Gil Blas*, where, under the veil of Spanish imagery he satirizes Parisian life, refers to it. Montesquieu in his *Lettres Persanes* also refers to it. "We have seen," writes the latter, "a whole nation, driven from their own country, cross the seas to settle in France, bringing with them, as a provision for the

[4] The official title of the Junior College was "*Communauté des Clers Irlandais.*" Hence the term 'Community boy.'

necessities of life, nothing but a formidable talent for disputation." [5]

Santeul, the friend of Bossuet, in his Latin poem on a degree day at the University, speaks of the notabilities who attended the ceremony, and amongst them of the Irish.

> "Vidi avidos vultus, et mentem pasta chimaeris
> Spectra Hibernorum, turmatim invadere portas." [6]

Ruhlière follows at a later date in the same strain, and in his poem *Sur les Disputes*, speaks of the

> "Pauvres Hibernois qui fuyant leur pays pour les saintes promesses
> Viennent vivre à Paris d'arguments et de Messes."

Nor does their reputation rest on these testimonies alone. In the 17th and 18th centuries, there was always a body of fifteen or twenty Irish masters of Arts, resident in the University of Paris, taking part in the work of the University, and attending the meetings of the section of the Faculty of Arts, known as *La nation d'Allemagne*: many Irishmen held chairs of Philosophy or Theology in the University Colleges. Amongst them may be mentioned Malachy O'Queeley, the martyred archbishop of Tuam, Dr. Molony of Killaloe, Dr. Sleyne, bishop of Cloyne, Dr. Plunket of Meath, Dr. M'Namara, Dr. Power, Dr. Aherne, Dr. Flood, and the celebrated Dr. Hook. Amongst the priests who returned to Ireland many had attained University honours. And to this day in many a graveyard in Ireland are to be seen tombstones of humble parish priests bearing the inscription, Doctor of the Sacred Faculty of Paris, or Doctor of the Sorbonne.

Nor was the reputation of the Irish students less conspicuous for orthodoxy than for talent. In 1651 in spite of the prohibition of the Rector of the University, they met and issued a declaration against Jansenism which they placed in the hands of St. Vincent de Paul. In 1676 their successors, in a letter to Rome, declared their abhorrence of the same heresy, and in 1736 after an official enquiry the Nuncio of the Holy See at Paris reported, that, at the Irish College nothing but the most correct doctrine was

[5] *Montesquieu*: *Lettres Persanes*, No. 36.
[6] *Santeul. Poem, Victorinus vindicatus.*

tolerated. Their moral conduct too was above reproach. In 1735 the Rector of the University having made a visitation of the Lombard College officially certified that the students were of blameless life and conduct. The students of the present day have not degenerated, and they are as free from the taint of Modernism, as were their predecessors in the past from that of Jansenism.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth century Irish influence was exercised in France both in court and camp, and the Irish college was the centre from which it emanated. One of its Rectors, Dr. Tyrel, was accredited agent of the Confederation of Kilkenny. At the Lombard College, James II returning from defeat at the Boyne received the sympathy and allegiance of the adherents to the Stuart cause. General O'Neil, Lally Tollendal, son of Lally of Fontenoy, Dr. Murry, professor of Medicine at the University, were visitors at the College, as were in more recent years Viscount O'Neil de Tyrone, Count Nugent, and one still more famous, Edmund Patrick MacMahon, Duke of Magenta and Marshal of France. The college chapel was from time to time thrown open to the public, and the feast of St. Brigid, and of St. Patrick, apostle of Ireland, were celebrated with due solemnity. During the great Revolution Mass continued to be celebrated in the chapels of the College, when the churches of the capital were closed.

IV.

WHAT THE COLLEGE HAS ACCOMPLISHED.

But it is time to look back and sum up what has been the work of the College, and to ask what it has done for the Church in Ireland during the three centuries of its existence. For two centuries it was the establishment which supplied the largest number of priests to the Irish mission. No doubt there were other Irish colleges on the continent at the time, at Rome, in Spain, in Flanders, and in the provinces of France. But the Irish College in Paris had the largest number of students. At the close of the eighteenth century, there were four hundred and seventy-eight Irish ecclesiastics pursuing their studies on the

continent. At Louvain 40, Antwerp 30, Salamanca 32, Rome 16, Lisbon 12, making a total of 130 outside France. In France there were 348 Irish students, of whom 80 were at Nantes, at Bordeaux 40, at Douay 30, at Toulouse 8, and 180 at Paris. Hence it appears that more than one-half of the priesthood of Ireland at that date were educated in France, and more than one-third of the entire priesthood of the country were students of the Irish College in Paris. Many amongst them rose to eminence in the Church. More than fifty ecclesiastics who had been students or Superiors of the College, governed Irish dioceses as bishops. Lecky, in his *History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century*, pays an eloquent tribute to Irish priesthood educated on the continent: "No subsequent class of Irish priests have left so good a name as the better class of those who were educated in the seminaries of France, Italy and Flanders, and the Irish College at Salamanca. They came to their ministry at a mature age, and with a real and varied knowledge of the world. If they produced little or nothing of lasting value in theology or literature, they had at least the manners of cultivated gentlemen, and a high sense of clerical decorum." (Lecky, *History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. III, pp. 354–55). Paris was the centre of all that was most refined in continental life, and the students of the Irish College in that capital are entitled to their full share in this eulogy. In the nineteenth century the majority of the priesthood have been educated at home. Yet the Irish College in Paris has continued its work, with an average of seventy to one hundred students. The priests who have gone forth from it, hold an honored place in the ranks of the Irish clergy. The bishops who have been its pupils, and amongst them Dr. Maginn of Derry, and Archbishop Croke of Cashel, have been second to none in zeal and patriotism. Today the College claims as her own Mgr. MacSherry of South Africa, and Mgr. Denis Kelly of Ross; and is proud to reckon amongst her past professors the eminent Cardinal Primate of Ireland.

But though the chief work of the College has been to train up good priests, she has not been inactive in other fields. The College claims to share with the Irish Seminary at Bordeaux the honor of being the Alma Mater of the historian Keating, and it

is beyond all doubt that Abbé McGeoghegan, Sylvester O'Hallaran, John Curry, and Martin Haverty, all historians of Ireland, were Paris students.

In those departments which are more exclusively ecclesiastical she has not been silent. Mgr. Messingham, one of the rectors of the College gave to Ireland a valuable volume *Florilegium Insulæ Sanctorum*, containing the history of her national saints. Rev. Andrew Donlevy another of her superiors, printed and published in Paris a catechism of Christian Doctrine in the Irish and English tongue, which contributed much to promote religious knowledge amongst the people. The history of the Papal States by Dr. Miley is widely known, and a French edition of it was published during the period of his rectorate in Paris. The numerous devotional works of Dean Kinane, a former pupil and professor of the College, have been translated into many languages.

The late Rev. Thomas MacNamara, rector of the College from 1868 to 1889, published during his term of office several works of great utility to ecclesiastics. His *Treatise on Sacred Rhetoric*, his *Encheiridion Clericorum* and *Allocutions on Liturgical Observances*, are replete with solid instruction. His book entitled *Programmes of Sermons and Instructions*, has passed through eight editions, and is a work of great utility to pastors who desire to give to their flock a course of practical instruction, such as our Holy Father Pius X prescribes.

The actual Vice-President of the college, Rev. John McGuinness, has published a course of Dogmatic Theology which for accuracy of doctrine and for clearness and precision of style is highly esteemed. The present writer has tried to rescue from oblivion the memory of benefactors, students and superiors of the College who were more zealous in doing good, than in recording what they had done.

Such in brief, is the history of the origin, organization, and work of the Irish College in Paris. Whether it will be permitted to continue in future its work for the Church in Ireland is at this moment uncertain. The French Government contemplates its suppression. That it has not been already closed is due to the intervention of Sir Edward Grey, British Minister of Foreign Affairs and that of the British Ambassador at Paris. Its suppres-

sion would mean a financial loss to every diocese of Ireland. It would sever what has been a bond of sympathy between Ireland and France for three hundred years. The College has already come forth safe from greater dangers. The influence of England saved it from confiscation in 1791, and that influence was never greater than it is now.

It never formed any part of the endowments of the French Church; and did not derive its existence from the Concordat. Its suppression is not required by any law of France. The Government of the Third Republic may suppress what all the previous Governments of France have protected. But it cannot blot out the good done for three hundred years by the students and priests of the College, who in their day "have made their lives sublime, and departing left behind them, footprints on the sands of time."

PATRICK BOYLE, C. M.

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NOTES ON EDUCATION.

The New Demand on the Primary School.

That our public schools are failing in several important respects is asserted on all sides. Business men find the graduates of our schools incompetent. Professional men contrast the children of to-day with the companions of their own school-days to the great disparagement of the former. In fact, the indictment against the public schools of the country is quite general and there are many who would include in this indictment the elementary schools throughout the country, whether public, parochial or private. Nor can it be said with truth that the schools themselves are satisfied with the work that is being done. The complaint on the part of the secondary schools is loud and long. In some places spelling is being introduced into the high school as a protest against the inefficiency of the grammar school methods. Recent tests in the eighth grade of the schools of some of our large cities have shown alarming results and multitudes of the teachers in the grammar schools throughout the country admit the full truth of the charge of inefficiency brought against the schools.

The sensational public tests of the eighth grade pupils of the Cleveland public schools during the past couple of years is likely to lead to some very radical changes this year. William H. Elson, superintendent of the Cleveland schools, is reported to have reached the conclusion that a departure from the purely academic studies in the grammar schools is demanded by the changed social and economic conditions of our times. At least he is determined to test the value of some of the suggestions offered as a remedy for the condition of things so bitterly complained of by the business men and citizens of Cleveland. These changes are to reach down to the fourth or fifth grades. From that time on through the grammar grades the children will be given a training along practical lines of trade, industry,

and commerce. More than half the time hitherto given to academic subjects, in the four last grades of the grammar schools, it is said, will be given in the future to teaching the boys the arts and crafts and to teaching the girls household work and domestic science. Shops, we are told, are to be installed in all the schools and the children will be required to operate the machines as part of their regular school work. This, it is contended, will give the children a working knowledge of the conditions which they must meet on leaving school and will double their initial earning power, while the children who are fortunate enough to be able to continue their studies in technical high schools will find themselves well equipped to take up the work there. The children who are looking forward to commercial lines of industry will be prepared during the last four years of the grammar school to enter the high school of commerce which is opening its doors to the children of Cleveland this year. Superintendent Elson is quoted as saying: "When we can get away from teaching the child the things that are of little value to him and replace them with subjects which, when mastered, will in the later years of his life mean dollars and cents to him, I think the educational problem will be solved. I believe that injecting commercialism in grammar school studies will go further in bringing beneficial conditions to the school child than any other method." Are the children of this generation to be buried under a hopeless mass of materialism and commercialism? Having banished God and all the high ideals from the higher institutions, are we to take away from the child the idealism that nature herself supplies so that his earning capacity may be doubled on leaving school!

Doctor William Bailey, Assistant Professor of Political Economy in Yale University, joins the chorus of those who complain bitterly of the inability to spell on the part of the students coming up to the colleges, Out of 250 essays of three thousand words each submitted by juniors and seniors he finds only 25 without a misspelled word. Of course Yale is not alone in the multitude of poor spellers among its students. In writing

on the subject in the *Independent,* Dr. Bailey says: "It is evident that something should be done to raise the standard of spelling among college students. But the college is not the place for such instruction. So many additional studies have been crowded into the grammar schools that spelling no longer occupies the position of prominence which it held fifty years ago. The spelling-bee was then possibly the chief intellectual test of the community. To be the best speller was a coveted honor. So many studies have been added to the curriculum that the time devoted to spelling must be curtailed. Perhaps we have gone too far. Certainly college students are deficient in this respect, and the college authorities are trying to place the blame where it belongs by making one of the tests in English the ability to write grammatical English in words correctly spelled. Doubtless spelling is to a considerable extent a memory test, which some persons find extremely difficult to master. Others can sympathize with Aldrich when he writes:

> 'My mind lets go a thousand things
> Like dates of wars and names of kings.'

but no one can blame the colleges of this country if they demand as one of the requirements of admission the ability on the part of the student correctly to spell words with which he would express his thoughts." Similar sentiments are expressed by many other university men. President Faunce, of Brown University, in a recent address at Chautauqua, N. Y., said: "I would like to see the colleges of the country join in an effort to induce the American people to write and speak the English tongue decently. The colleges are not doing it now. Many of our college seniors cannot write a decent business letter. . . . "

The Washington *Herald,* of November 8, reveals a condition of things in this city which is not so different from that which obtains elsewhere. The writer says: "Failure properly to impress the elementary studies upon the grammar school pupils, combined with inadequate legislation in the matter of promoting teachers, has stirred up a storm of criticism among the

citizens of Washington. . . . Business men say high school pupils come to them unable to construct a letter or accurately add a column of figures. Spelling is found by them to be a sort of hit-or-miss operation on the part of the graduates. The methodical drilling found in the schools of twenty years ago has been superseded, they say, by a system of general education wherein the pupil takes up a variety of subjects and studies them superficially without devoting the necessary time to spelling, arithmetic, and American history. Superintendent Stuart and Captain Oyster of the Board of Education agree the system of promotion now in vogue among teachers is not all that it should be. Under the existing laws teachers of pronounced efficiency in the lower grades cannot be kept there at a raise in salary. If they are promoted, it means that they are transferred to a higher grade and their pupils are instructed by a normal school graduate. Old teachers are kept on the pay-roll because no pensioning clause provides for them when they have outlived their usefulness."

There is, in fact, a general agreement as to the inefficiency of the elementary school, but there is anything but agreement in the causes assigned for the obvious failure. The reason for this disagreement is to be found in the fact that there are many causes contributory to the undesirable results. The absence of adequate objective training, which was formerly supplied by the industrial home, is frequently emphasized, and I believe that it is one of the main factors in the problem. The absence of adequate religious training is insisted upon by others. The extent to which this is a real contributary cause may be discovered by a careful comparison of the public schools with the parochial schools of the country. The fragmenting of the school curriculum brought about by the multiplying of books and courses at a time when the child-mind is insufficiently developed is doubtless a factor of no inconsiderable importance. We have discussed this elsewhere and shall have occasion to return to it a little later on.

From time to time defenders of present grammar school methods seek to shift the blame to the primary schools. It is

claimed that the children come up from the primary schools with faculties that have been numbed and with characters that have been formed in too yielding a mold. It is said the children love to play and to have all the work done for them and that it is next to impossible to arouse them to self-activity or to concentrated attention. And the primary school frequently throws back the burden on the kindergarten. This state of affairs calls to mind the scene in the Garden of Eden, Adam seeking to throw the blame on Eve, while Eve cast it upon the poor serpent. But a careful examination of primary methods and primary text-books now in use reveals the fact that this part of the school system is really more to blame for the failures of older pupils than was hitherto suspected.

From one point of view the whole of education may be looked upon as the adjustment of the individual to his environments. The adjustment of the child to the child-environment, but still more, the adjustment of the youth leaving school to the social and industrial environments into which he must enter, is taken as the standard when measuring the efficiency of the school system. The profound and rapid changes which are taking place in the social and economic world in our own day of course demand equally radical and profound changes in the work of the schools that are responsible for the adjustment of the pupils to the environments which they must enter upon leaving school. The transition from school to the adult world is naturally the stage in the process that is first to attract attention. The pupil on leaving the high school fails to pass the entrance examination to a college and straightway the blame is laid at the door of the high school and the demand is made that it raise its standard. The pupil from the grammar school enters a department store and when the employer discovers that he is unable to spell or to add up the price of a simple bill of goods, a protest goes up against the inefficiency of the grammar school. In response to pressure of this kind modifications are made and others suggested for the grammar school and high school. It seems to be taken for granted that a few changes in the curriculum during the last year or two of the pupil's stay in

school will remedy the defects of which complaint is made. But the superficiality of this view scarcely need be dwelt upon in these pages. A finishing school does not educate and cannot give culture. A glossing over of the surface does not change the nature of anything. If the product of the school is unsatisfactory, the process should be examined in its entirety; for the real difficulty may be found at a very early instead of at a late stage in the process, and as a matter of fact this is the case in the present situation. The home life of our city children especially has undergone a complete revolution within the past few decades and our schools have not yet taken this sufficiently into account, and so they have failed more signally in the process of adjusting the child to the child-environment than in that of adjusting the graduate to his adult environment.

In the old days when the duties and responsibilities of the industrial home developed the character of the child and built up vigorous apperception masses from the constant contact with an objective world, any method, however formal, might be employed in the school to teach him the art of reading. Under those circumstances alphabet and phonic methods frequently failed to destroy the child's interest in reality. A few hours drill a day was pitted against the rest of the child's life. And so the child's interest in the things of an objective world remained dominant and strength of character, he developed in an environment filled with real struggles, frequently proved sufficient to carry the pupil through the dullest and driest drills of the alphabet method and where this failed, the birch was called into requisition as an efficient supplement.

To-day all this is changed. The teacher is not allowed to use coercive methods on "mama's darling"; not only is the birch relegated to the lumber room, but every semblance of coercion must be banished in deference to the softer methods used in the home. We are not now quarreling with this state of affairs; we are merely pointing out the fact that this change in the child's home environment must be reckoned with in our schools. Methods which succeeded under the old conditions

may prove quite inadequate in the present situation. One thing is clear; if coercion, which was necessary under the old conditions, is removed at present, its place must be supplied by an increased interest in the objects of study, otherwise the work of education will fail. And secondly, if the sense training given in the homes of the former generation is no longer to be had in the homes of our children, it must be supplied in the school in some way or the work of education will be directed towards form without content and the result will be hopeless inefficiency in the pupils when they are confronted with real situations on leaving school.

In the old days the most incompetent teacher in the school was assigned to the " baby class," and the efficiency of a teacher was recognized by promoting her to a higher grade. Academic content rather than professional training was the standard by which a teacher's value was rated, and in this fact was found the reason for assigning the poorest teacher to the lowest class. Anyone was supposed to be able to make the children recite their a, b, c's and to hear them spell their words of one or two syllables.

But to-day this is very generally changed. Owing to progress in the professional training of teachers, the fact is now recognized that a sucessful primary teacher is not easily obtained and that the greatest amount of professional training is needed in the lowest grades. This of course implies that the standard of efficiency in the primary teacher has been shifted from academic content to professional training. The teacher's method is our present object of examination and this is as it should be.

But there is another side to the question. The teacher and the text-book which she is compelled to use should harmonize. Good results can hardly be expected where the method employed by the teacher is counteracted by an opposite method in the child's text-book. Clearly, if the teacher's methods are faulty, they should be corrected, or else she should be removed from the school. This is particularly true in the primary grades where so much admittedly depends on method. In like man-

ner, where the method embodied in the text-book is faulty, it should be corrected, or the text-book should be removed from the school. Agreement here is essential and frequently there is anything but agreement.

Professor Scott, of the University of Michigan, writing in the *Educational Review* for April, 1909, under the title "A Brief Catechism on Text-Books in English," has many things to say that are well worth considering. After pointing out the fact that the teacher, not the text-book, is the chief factor, he continues: "Of what use, then, is the text-book? It has a variety of uses. For one thing, it economizes the teacher's time and energy. It assembles materials—selections, pictures, exercises, and principles—which the teacher could not herself bring together without great labor and expense and which she could not afford to put into print. For another thing, it economizes the pupil's time and energy, since it gives into his hands in compact, convenient, and permanent form what otherwise would be scattered about in his mind, in his note-book, in the library, or on the blackboard. Still further, the text-book, if it is good, suggests new ways of teaching, new points of view, novel and ingenious exercises. In a word, it adds to the teacher's resources. What are the essentials of a good text-book in English? They are the same as the characteristics of a good teacher—sympathy, interest, originality, progressiveness, stimulus to thought and work. Every good text-book has a personal quality. It is like the voice of a kind, helpful, broadminded, progressive teacher. It is full of impulses. There is uplift and 'go' in it. The pupil in after years remembers it not with scorn and weariness, but with gratitude. How should the teacher regard the text-book? As a friend and ally. How do some teachers treat their text-books? As tyrants or dictators, as fetiches to be worshipped, rather than as instruments to be used. . . . What should a text-book in English aim to accomplish? It should supplement and fortify the teacher's work in two respects. In the first place it should cultivate freedom of speech. It should aid in lifting the floodgates of childish thought. It should set the imprisoned spirit

free, letting it rush out through tongue and pen in spontaneous expression. It should make the practice of writing and speaking seem as natural and necessary as sunshine and fresh air and play. It should also reveal to the child the value of speech as a means of communion with his fellows. But in the second place it should cultivate orderliness of speech. It should impress upon the childish mind the need of form and order and selection and restraint. It should cultivate taste and a sense for the idiom and traditions of the mother-tongue. Still further, it should accomplish these two aims simultaneously, so that the pupil, in the end, realizes that the only true freedom of speech is the freedom that comes from obedience to the laws of language. How can the text-book in English help the teacher to do these things? (1) By setting before the pupil choice specimens of prose and poetry adapted to his stage of development. These specimens, if they are readable and suggestive, will stick in his mind and form standards for his own speaking and writing. They will also stimulate his imagination and inspire him to express his own ideas. (2) By asking live, pointed, and thought-provoking questions about his reading, his thoughts, his experiences and his observations. . . . What is the final test of a good text-book in English? Its effects upon the pupil's mental habits and character. If, with a good teacher behind it, the book promotes spiritual growth—if, in Professor John Dewey's words, it ' removes friction, frees activity, economizes effort, makes for richer results,'—it is good. If it does not do these things, it is bad, and should be cast into outer darkness."

The teacher seldom has a voice in the selection of the text-book and those on whom the task of selecting the books devolves are frequently devoid of all knowledge of primary methods. Other considerations, such as the cost of the book, the firm that publishes it, etc., are allowed to sway their judgment. Here, therefore, is a state of affairs that will bear looking into. If the work in the primary grades is not conducted along right lines an injury is inflicted upon the children at the very beginning of their school life. Experience shows that a large per-

centage of the children never recover from the vicious mental habits set up in the kindergarten and in the primary grades. It is high time that attention was called to the methods employed by the primary teacher and to the methods embodied in the primary books which she is compelled to use.

Books for Primary Grades.

The name 'reader' applied to the books used by the children in the first and second grades of the primary school is either a misnomer perpetuating an ancient error, such as is perpetuated by the phrases 'sun-rise' and 'sun-set,' or else it implies the embodiment of a principle in the books which is in open conflict with the current doctrines in psychology and in linguistic science. An examination of the primers and first readers that were almost universally employed a few decades ago and that may still be found in some of our schools reveals the fact that the name 'reader' is not understood as a misnomer. These books are constructed on the principle that the child should be rendered familiar with the letters of the alphabet and with their varied combinations in syllables, words and sentences before any attempt should be made to give the child thought material through the instrumentality of written language. In these books the child's interest is directed exclusively to the verbal series. The real series is either entirely banished or else relegated to a subordinate place. In response to the demands of science a new primary book is being produced in our own day in which the thought element predominates from the very first and in which the attempt is made to teach the art of reading as a means to an end. The child's attention is directed throughout to the thought element and only allowed to dwell upon the formal elements incidentally. On the basis of this fundamental principle, therefore, we may divide all primary books into two groups and the first factor in our decision concerning the availability of a primary book must be our attitude towards this fundamental principle.

Why do we teach our children to read? This question may conceivably be answered in two ways. We teach them to read because as adults the art of reading will prove a valuable asset in the struggle for existence. It may enable John to earn his living as a proof reader and for this purpose the more vividly he realizes the form of words and sentences the more readily will he detect misspelled words, broken or inverted type, etc. Every time his attention wanders to the thought back of the printed page he is liable to pass over unchallenged some error in typography. If, therefore, the end we have in view in teaching children to read is that they may become proof readers on leaving school, we shall be acting quite consistently in holding their attention to the form of words instead of to the meaning that lies back of the printed page. But if our purpose in teaching the art of reading is to enable both the boy and the man to profit by the wisdom that is enshrined in our literature, then our aim must be to render the thought element as vivid as possible and every intrusion of the verbal element upon consciousness must be regarded as a defect. Now, the percentage of children who are destined to become proof readers is so small as to be practically a negligible quantity and we may leave them out of consideration in our present discussion. In teaching the art of reading, therefore, the goal of our ambition must be to enable the reader to grasp the thought back of the printed page as strongly, as quickly and with as little expenditure of mental energy as may be, and this goal once having been determined upon, must in turn determine the means to be employed.

It is a well known psychological law that of two alternative mental states the one first to be established tends to maintain its position at the center of consciousness and to banish the other to the field of indirect mental vision. The conclusion, therefore, of this line of reasoning is obvious. *It is a grave mistake to direct the child's attention to the verbal element during the first years of his endeavor to master the art of reading,* for the natural consequence of such a procedure is to develop in the pupil the proof reader habit of looking at the words instead of through them at the thought. Such pupils

leave school with a screen built up between their minds and the thoughts that were bequeathed to them in the literature of the world.

This is the position taken by Thomas M. Balliet, Ph. D., Dean of the School of Pedagogy of New York University, New York City, in a paper on 'Reading' in the *Atlantic Journal of Education,* January, 1909. We have commented on this article in the March number of the *Bulletin,* but the matter is so pertinent to our present question that we cannot forbear quoting him once more. "The habit of unconsciousness of the page in reading makes for speed and for thoroughness in grasping the thought. All needless consciousness of the page robs the mind of just so much power to grasp the thought. . . . Words are like window panes—they are things to look through, not things to look at. The more invisible they are the more perfectly do they serve their purpose. Any method in teaching a child to read which makes him needlessly conscious of words, which fosters in him the habit of needlessly scrutinizing them or of analyzing them needlessly into their component letters or sounds, develops the proof reader habit of mind, and may make the process of reading a needlessly conscious one all through life. The child must, of course scrutinize new words sufficiently to remember them, but any analysis or inspection of words beyond what is necessary for this purpose is unquestionably bad. . . . Everything which in later life should be done unconsciously, should be taught in the school unconsciously or with a minimum degree of consciousness. It is bad doctrine to say that such processes should be raised to consciousness and then be made unconscious by practice. The difficulty is that in most people such processes never become unconscious. The child learns to pronounce and to speak his mother-tongue mainly by unconscious imitation and he speaks it unconsciously; the adult learns to speak a foreign language by a process that is keenly conscious and he is seldom able to speak it without watching his speech. . . . Illustrations from school and from life might be multiplied indefinitely to show how important it is to teach unconsciously, so far as

possible, what must in life be done unconsciously. Reading is one of these things. The phonic and alphabetical methods, used at the beginning, are likely to lead to a wholly unnecessary degree of word consciousness in reading. The fact that they give the child early the power of finding out the pronunciation of new words by himself, does not necessarily recommend them. If they develop the habit of looking at words instead of through them, this result would show not in the primary grades, but in the middle and upper grades of the elementary schools where it is attributed to other causes." (Pp. 5, 6.)

Here we have one phase of the failure of the elementary school traced back to an unsuspected source in the primary grades. Whether we wholly agree with Professor Balliet or not, the case is well worth investigation. If Professor Balliet's contention is correct, the methods of teaching reading employed by the primary teacher and embodied in the primary text-books may give us the solution of the old puzzle: why the children lose interest in school before they reach the seventh grade and why they are anxious to escape from school, even if such escape means entering the field of hard manual labor. Where the children's interest rests in the verbal series, where it centers around the combination of letters into syllables and syllables into words, it may be preserved during the first two or three years of school life, but by the end of this period this source of interest is exhausted and the sources of permanent interest in the thought have not only been neglected but have been positively excluded from the child's mind by the screen built up through the habit of looking at the words instead of through them. Again, among the indictments brought against the primary school is frequently included the charge that the children are unable to think for themselves or to take the thought from the printed page and clothe it in their own words. This failure would also be explained by the employment in the primary grades of the methods condemned by Professor Balliet.

Alphabet and phonic methods fall under the condemnation of another group of thinkers from quite a different set of considerations. These methods assume that the right way to pro-

ceed in teaching the art of reading is to develop the child's power to recognize letters, words and sentences. In a word, we must teach the child to read first and then to find the thought back of the printed page. Now, the whole current of modern thought is away from this procedure. The biologist tells us that in race history organs were built by their successful functioning, or at least perfected in this way. And practical men have always held that it was blacksmithing that made a blacksmith. "Fabricando fit faber." No amount of preliminary instruction added to finger exercises and drills on the scales would make a musician. And so it is contended that the child should learn to read by reading and not by the study of alphabets, syllables and key words.

Dr. Bolling, in a very able discussion of the mental condition upon which our ability to speak a language depends, uses an argument which finds direct application in the solution of our present problem. "We have already seen reasons to believe that this object which we would describe is exceedingly complex; and accordingly our first effort must be to separate it into simpler parts, to find the materials of which it is composed. The teaching of traditional grammar has been that the elements of our speech are single sounds, that we combine these into syllables, the syllables into words, and the words into sentences. It would seem therefore, at first sight, that we had mapped out before us the road we should follow. To do so would be to fall into the mistake of believing that our language was actually built up from the elements that our analysis finds in it." [1]

The line of reasoning here runs counter to the practice of teaching the child the letters first and then arranging the letters into syllables of various sounds and finally of combining them into words or sentences having a definite meaning. It may also be used with equal effect against the practices enjoined by the phonic method. There are, in fact, two distinct methods embodied in the group of text-books which we are here dis-

[1] *Elements of the Study of Language.* George Melville Bolling, Ph. D., Professor of Greek and Sanskrit, Catholic University of America. Catholic Education Press, Washington, D. C. P. 81.

cussing: the alphabet method and the phonic method. Both of these methods unite in the one common defect of producing word consciousness in the child, but each method has its separate characteristics which it will be more convenient to study separately.

The Alphabet Method.

All that has been said against the two methods above mentioned for the development of word consciousness in the child applies with especial force to the alphabetic method which was in general use not very many years ago, and if the employment of this method in the schools of the past failed to produce the evil results of which complaint is now being made, the reason is to be sought in the home conditions which have vanished, and in the great amount of time devoted to drills in spelling, which can no longer be afforded owing to the new demands that are being made upon the school. The alphabet method not only insisted that the child should begin with the ultimate elements of our analysis of written language and of these build up systematically words and sentences, but in the accomplishment of this task it frequently failed to make any attempt to awaken or maintain the child's interest in the tasks which were set him. He learned his alphabet and his monosyllabic and polysyllabic words solely through the application of voluntary attention, intensified by the hope of reward or the stimulus of fear. A great deal has been written and said against this method, and in its worst forms it has in fact passed out of use. The child does not naturally learn language by combining its ultimate elements into larger and still larger units, but quite the contrary. In this he is but following the general law of his mental life and growth. "It is an important characteristic of perception that we perceive the objects of perception as single objects. As Angell puts it, 'Although the chair has four legs and a seat, we do not see each of the legs as separate things, and then somehow put them together with the seat, and so mentally manufacture a chair for ourselves. On the contrary, our immediate response is the consciousness of a single object. We know, of

course, that the chair possesses these various parts, just as we know that it has various colors, and in a sense we notice these features when we perceive it. But the striking thing is that despite the great number of sensory nerves which are being stimulated by such an object, we perceive it, not as an aggregate of qualities a + b + c, but as a unit, a whole, which we can, if necessary, analyze into its parts.' Now, it is in the same way that our perceptions of words take place, and in one respect the fact is more striking. The auditory stimuli are received by the ear not simultaneously but successively, and yet we perceive the word as a whole, not as an aggregate of successive sounds. We can, it is true, analyze the word into these sounds, just as we can analyze our percepts of the chair into percepts of its four legs and seat, but it would be a delusion to believe that we do so in the course of normal speech." [2]

The argument here of course applies to phonic methods directly, but it may be seen to apply with still greater force to the alphabet method, for whereas the ear is compelled to take in the separate sounds successively, the eye gathers up simultaneously the various letters and syllables in the printed word.

The Phonic Method.

The phonic method possesses certain apparent advantages over the alphabet method which have brought it into much vogue with the present generation of primary teachers. It interests the children. The key method (a modification of the phonic method) offers an interesting and at times a somewhat exciting game to the children and the immediate result is a rapid progress in the child's ability to find the pronunciation of new words. It is not surprising, therefore, that the phonic method should be eagerly substituted for the dry and uninteresting alphabet drills of the old school. But it must be obvious that if the child is introduced to the art of reading

[2] Bolling, *Ibid.*, pp. 93–4.

through the phonic method, the result will be an intensified form of the evil complained of in these pages. The very interest which the child takes in his key words and which enables him to make such rapid progress is an interest in the wrong direction, since it is concerned wholly with the formal element to the neglect of the thought. In consequence of the prevalent use of this method in our schools during the last decades the children in the higher grammar grades are found to have comparatively little power of getting the thought from the printed page. There is another respect also in which the phonic method sins deeply against the child's best interests. It places undue stress on the sound series as opposed to the visual series and thus relates the written word with its object through the round-about way of the spoken word. The visual image is related to the auditory image of a word and this auditory image of a word is in turn related to the object, while the direct connection between the written word and its object may be, and frequently is, entirely neglected. The case here is analogous to that of one who attempts to use a foreign language while doing all his thinking in his own language. Pupils taught in this way are compelled to translate the written page into spoken language before they can understand it. The needless waste of mental energy and the consequent clumsiness of the process are too obvious to need comment.

Dr. Bolling, in describing the associations between the visual and auditory images of words and the movements of the organs of speech, says (*Ibid.*, p. 102), " An association of a third degree of strength is that between the visual sensation and the articulatory movement sensations, there being no association in the opposite direction. It is deserving of notice that by means of it and the associations of the movement sensations and the auditory sensations there may be set up a round-about association between the visual sensation and the idea. Indeed, with careless teaching this is likely to be the permanent result in which case the direct associations between the visual sensations and the idea would be lacking."

It should be observed that all the evil effects traced to both the

alphabet method and the phonic method in varying degrees is due to the fact that these methods are used in the initial stages of the process of learning to read. They tend to develop word consciousness because the analysis of the word precedes its function as a means of conveying thought. And they violate the natural process by beginning with the elements instead of the natural mental wholes. No argument thus far brought against these methods applies to them if employed at a later stage in the process of reading. The child should learn to spell, of course, and he should learn how to divide his words into syllables. The only question is when he shall learn it. After he knows the word and is familiar with its use, or prior to such knowledge? Phonetic drills may be very useful in correcting faulty pronunciation, but no child learns to speak his mother-tongue by being drilled first on the separate phonetic elements. The argument here is parallel with that which has placed formal grammar in the higher grammar grades, the contention being that the child should learn to use language correctly first and then he may profitably be taught the laws which govern such usage.

The Word Method.

The word or sentence method, as it is sometimes called, escapes many of the accusations brought against the alphabet and phonic methods. It at least conforms to the demands of psychology in presenting the whole before the parts. The written sentence, whether it consists of one or more words, should function for the child as a whole. It should convey to him a thought, a permission to act, or be the means of conveying his thought to others. The dry and uninteresting drills preceding functioning are here absent. His power of written language, like his lungs, yields results from the very first, and the organ is perfected by its functioning instead of being perfected first through several years of dry drills in order that it might later on be fit to function. But it is quite possible to use the word method in such a way as to defeat the legitimate

purposes of the art of reading. This is the case where sentences are used as mere drills, where the thought is fragmentary and uninteresting to the child. But the word or sentence method properly applied may serve to lead the child by the most direct path to the mastery of his art. This is the case when the content chosen is of the right kind. We shall have more to say of this later on, but before taking up the group of readers in which content is made the dominant element it may be well to examine a few specimens of the type of readers embodying the methods against which we are protesting.

It has been shown that where the child's interest is allowed to rest with the printed words and with their composition and varied combinations he acquires the habit of looking at the printed page instead of at the thought which it should reveal. Such a habit proves in the highest degree injurious to the pupil after he has mastered the elements of the art of reading. The games of word building and sentence making soon lose interest for the growing boy and as this is all that the book yields him, his interests soon lead him out of school and away from books. Such boys are frequently found possessed of a good power of thinking when they are confronted with real situations in their play and at their work, but in the schoolroom they are usually dubbed dullards and are to be found among the 'repeaters' in each grade.

Illustrations of the types embodying the alphabet and phonic methods will at once occur to the reader, for numerous exemplars of both types may still be found in the schoolroom, a fact which goes to show how slowly progress in psychology finds its way into our primary text-books. It is true that the alphabet method has generally passed out of the training schools for teachers and there are few teachers to-day who would openly advocate its use, nevertheless, books embodying this method are still put into the hands of the teachers and they are required to use them in their classrooms. At this point in our study a few specimens from these readers will prove serviceable in showing how completely the formal element dominated the compilers of these books. Word drills, and word drills alone,

seem to be their purpose. Here is the fourth reading lesson of a primer published in Baltimore in 1886:[3] "Is it an ox? It is an ox. Is he on an ox? He is on an ox. Oh! so he is." Lesson VII reads as follows: "Nell is in bed. Let me be led to her. Set my wet net on a peg at ten. The pet hen is fed. We met ten men. Get me a red net." The first of these exercises was evidently meant for a drill on the letter 'o'; the second for a drill on the letter 'e.' Of course the child was not expected to find anything of interest in the thought. This book never went into general use, but it does not differ in any material way from books published at a much later date and which are now in quite general use. Here, for example, is the first lesson in a first reader published in New York in 1903 and which is widely used in our schools at the present time.[4]

LESSON I.

"Sēe the căt the dŏg
see *the cat* *the dog*

See dog cat

See the dog. See the cat."

There is very little danger that the child's interest will wander away from the words to the thought in such a lesson as this. If it be argued that this is a first lesson and that the thought element will come into prominence later, an examination of the book will readily undeceive us. There is no continuity in its thought and the fragments are neither sufficient in themselves to develop an interest in the child, nor are they associated closely enough with the child's experience to make them live in a borrowed interest. How completely the thought element is obscured for the sake of the mere formal element may be seen from the last lesson in the book.

[3] *Illustrated Catholic Reader.* John Murphy & Co., Baltimore.
[4] *The New Century Catholic Series.* Benziger Bros., New York.

Lesson 84 — Review

" All your life, from the moment you were born, an angel has been ever at your side. He prays for you and watches over you. For his sake, then, be careful never to sin.

" The next time that you send a letter to any one, take more pains with it than you did with the last.

" It was on a moonlight night last August that the wagon and harness were stolen from the barn.

" I am told that when Bingo, our dog, got sight of the froggie squatted upon the floor, he ran for it, tossed it over his head, and left it dead. He did not mean to hurt it, for he is not a fierce beast. I suppose he thought it was fun.

" John has some paper feathers, tied with a string.

" Fred has a sad face, but a brave heart.

" One pleasant summer day, some people, whose names I do not remember, came from New York in a light wagon.

" I sighed when I heard the babies cry so bitterly.

" Always say your prayers, night and morning, and keep from everything bad. That is the safe way.

" A hungry fox once saw some grapes spread far above his head. He knew that he would enjoy them ever so much, but they were out of his reach.

" Did you ever hear the story of the man who thought he only needed a pair of spectacles, and that then he could read?

" Mother wishes you to lay this book away; it might be kept on the safe.

" At table you should help another before you help yourself.

" What news do you bring of the race? The turtle won by some minutes; he moved slowly and seemed to creep along, but he kept at it. The rabbit stopped to sleep, but when he woke, he found the turtle was waiting at the tree.

" I hope father will reach home safely.

" When I spoke to the man he stopped to think before he answered me.

" You might help me to write the story of Tobias and the angel. While you are doing this I will look for my spectacles. I suppose you are willing; you have no use for spectacles.

"Fred does not act well, nor can he sing a song.
"The dog stretched himself out in the sun and died.
"Your hat and sword are in the other room, if you want them.
"Can you tell us what a snowflake looks like?"

It is quite evident that the writer of this lesson had not the slightest consciousness of the child's need for an organized thought content. To what shall we liken the jumble of thoughts thrown together here without a semblance of organization? Is it the confusion of moving day? but this falls far short of it, for each article of furniture is at least complete, however forlorn it may look in the confusion, whereas in the lesson which we have just quoted only fragments of the thoughts appear. Shall we liken it to a New England boiled dinner, a *pot pourri*, or Neptune's tribute? The latter would certainly be the proper simile if the child's mental appetite is taken into account. As items of knowledge the specimens included in the above lesson are absolutely valueless since they are shorn of their real meaning. The compiler kept some of the external trappings but missed the real thought in almost every case. Verily, "the letter killeth, it is the spirit that giveth life." The only conceivable justification for such a reading lesson as the foregoing is to be found in the alphabet method, where every available means is taken to banish the thought element from the child's attention while he is learning his letters and words. These books linger among us, it is true, but the pedagogue would indeed be bold who would attempt to justify the principles which they embody, and the primary teacher who would attempt to follow such methods to-day would be regarded as an anachronism.

A late development of the phonetic method, known as the "Synthetic Phonic Word Method,"[5] is embodied in a series of readers published in New York in 1900. Book

[5] The New Education Readers: A Synthetic and Phonic Word Method by A. J. Demarest, Supt. Public Instruction, Hoboken, N. J., and William M. VanSickle, American Book Company, New York.

I of this series contains some of the worst features of the fragment building process. The child is taught phonics by the animals. Thus he learns from the cat how to pronounce 'f,' from the dove how to pronounce 'd,' from the cow how to pronounce 'm,' from the dog how to pronounce 'r,' and from the sound made by hot iron plunged in water how to pronounce 's.' The circular saw teaches him the sound of 'n' and the locomotive furnishes him a model for 'p.' A rat in a trap teaches the letter 'y' and the cow-bell sounds 'l.' Of course the bumble bee gives 'z.' The first lesson contains a story to be told by the teacher about the barn and its inmates. This story ends with the teacher imitating a cross cat in pronouncing 'f' while she writes the letter on the board. She is cautioned to give the sound of the letter only, not its name. The lesson continues: "What did the cross cat say? Children: The cross cat said f-f-f. The teacher writes 'f' on the board but does not give the name of the letter. She also draws a picture of the cat." The reading lesson itself is as follows:

f *f*

f-f-f (Picture of cat)

NEW STOCK WORDS.

apple	an	it	is
apple	*an*	*it*	*is*

Is it an apple?

(Picture of an apple)

It is an apple.

The next morning the children are taken to the barn again, in imagination, of course, where they imagine they hear the doves saying 'd,' and the reading lesson following this story consists of a picture of a dove with three 'd's' coming from his bill, a review of the consonant 'f' in script and in print, which, as in the foregoing lesson, is set off in a square, and the new

consonant 'd' in print and in script is added in a square of its own, and then the following reading lesson is given:

REVIEW STOCK WORDS

apple	an	it	is
apple	*an*	*it*	*is*

NEW STOCK WORDS			NEW BLEND WORDS
has	see	Fannie	fan
has	*see*	*Fannie*	*fan*

(a picture of Fannie)

See Fannie!
See Fannie!
Has Fannie an apple?
Has Fannie an apple?

The third day's drill opens with the following:

REVIEW STOCK WORDS

apple	an	it	is	Fannie	has	see
apple	*an*	*it*	*is*	*Fannie*	*has*	*see*

I have quoted the foregoing at some length in the endeavor to convey some idea of the overwhelming drill element which this book presents in the child's first reading lessons together with the entire absence of interesting content, but no description can do justice to the book, it must be seen and examined in its entirety in order to be appreciated. It is hard to conceive how anyone at all familiar with child-psychology could be guilty of placing such a barrier between the child and the art of reading, but there are some things in modern education that really pass understanding, and among them may be numbered the fact that the names of two prominent educators are to be found on the title-pages of these books. The fact that these two superintendents have the deciding of the fate of so large a number

of our school children at the present day would incline most of us to return to these books and give them a more serious study in the belief that we must be mistaken. Perhaps it is only the first few lessons that are burdened with this tedium of drill. We find that there is continuity running through the book. Fannie and Dan and Grace and Fannie's father and mother play conspicuous parts, but this is insufficient to prove continuity of interest.

We give here the twelfth day's reading lesson:

"Fannie is at the rill. Fannie has a can and a book. Will Fannie fill the can at the rill? No, the can has ink in it. The ink is for her father. Her father is at the mill. Dan is at home. The book is for Dan. Has the book ink on it? The book has ink on it."

If the reading lesson is dreary, what shall we say of the drills? Here each day is repeated all the words and consonants previously learned and a new word or two is added. The absurdity of this procedure grows on one as the book proceeds. Here, for example, is the twentieth day's drill:

Review consonants.

f	s	m	t	r	n	d	p	h	b	w

Review Stock Words

Fannie	apple	has	an	it	is	or	her	father	the	
tree	he	can	eat	red	see	book	bird	on	at	
home	flag	boy	ill	what	ink	and	ail	are	cat	
does	you	look	no	do	want	girl	she	egg	give	
in	yes	mother	all	pretty	pear	red				

Review Blend Words

Fan	for	man	Dan	sit	seat	ran	books	fat	
hats	mat	rat	Nat	Nan	meat	will	rill	win	
fill	tin	tail	pan	pink	pat	pail	sand	his	hat
hand	wants	hill	hail	bat	bats	band			

The reading lesson for this day is in keeping with the drill.

Review Sentences

Is it a pear or an apple? Fannie has an apple. Her father has a fan and a pear. Dan is in the apple tree. Can you see the flag? Fannie is under the pear tree. Nat and Nan are in the mill. A fat rat ran on the mat. The rat has his home in the mill. See the cat look at Nan. Do you want a pretty hat? Father will give Dan a pretty flag. Can you see the boy and the cat?

"To the teacher: Continue the drill work as previously planned, reviewing each day the consonants, stock words and blend words used in all preceding lessons or as much as is necessary to make the teaching thorough."

What need is there for further testimony? If we had reason to complain of the last primary reader which we were studying for the senseless jumble of thought in its review lesson, where shall we find words adequate to express our appreciation of this book? It is not here a matter of neglecting interesting content. All possible content is banished. We might as well teach the child to read backwards so as to make sure that he would not be tempted to think about the content back of the words. Is it any wonder that complaint is made of the work done in our schools when the children are started out in this way?

Thomas Edward Shields.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi Catholique; sous la direction de A. D'Alès. Fascicule Ier, Agnosticisme-Aumône. Paris: G. Beauchesne & Cie, 1909. 160 pp. 4to.

Among the many erudite works that are happily to be found in the theological literature of modern France, the *Apologetic Dictionary of the Catholic Faith* has held a place of honor. There could be no better testimony to its merit and popularity than the fact that it is now appearing in a fourth edition, of which the first part, embracing 160 pages in quarto, has come to hand. The editors aim to bring the work thoroughly up to date so that it shall reflect the results of the best scholarship of today. To this end the articles are being recast by noted scholars of France under the competent direction of the Abbé Adhémar d'Alès, professor in the Catholic Institute of Paris, and author of the excellent book entitled the *Theology of Tertullian*.

To extend the usefulness of the dictionary as far as possible, it has been deemed wise not to restrict the articles to subjects comprised within the limits of apologetics proper, but to include as well the treatment of many other questions that are often exploited to the prejudice of the Catholic Church. Hence in the First Part recently issued, one finds along with articles bearing on the foundations of Catholic belief, others of no little interest and importance, such as the Albigenses, Alexander VI, Antichrist, Apocrypha of the Old and New Testaments, Art, Asceticism, Almsgiving.

The thoroughness and comprehensiveness with which the more important articles on subjects strictly apologetic are treated may be judged from the fact that to the subject of agnosticism thirty-seven closely printed pages are devoted, to that of the soul twenty-eight, to that of apologetics thirty.

Among the contributors of the First Part, all of whom are priests, are worthy representatives both of the secular clergy and of the religious orders,—the Abbés Batiffol, Sertillanges, Vacandard, Nau, Lepin ; Bishop Le Roy, Superior General of the Fathers of the Holy Ghost, Fathers Coconnier and Lemonyer of the Dominican Order, Fathers Chossat and Bachelet of the Society of Jesus, and Dom

Souben, O. S. B. Names like these are a guarantee of the ripe scholarship that one looks for in a dictionary of this kind, and that is surely to be found in the pages already published.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

The Mass in the Infant Church, by the Rev. Garrett Pierse. Presented to the Theological Faculty in St. Patrick's College, Maynooth, for the Degree of Doctor of Divinity. Dublin : M. H. Gill & Son, 1909. Pp. iv + 197.

The purpose of the author as expressed in the Preface is "to find whether the doctrine of the Mass can be found in the infant church." For reasons which are set forth at length he limits his researches "to the period roughly speaking from 150 to 250 A. D." Though positive rather than polemical in tone, the scope of the book brings the author into conflict with many new writers on the same subject, and his conclusions he regards as a refutation of theirs. He considers the statements of Professor Harnack "as fairly representative of recent Protestant ideas concerning the early Christian concept of sacrifice." More attention however is paid to the views of such men as Renz and Wieland. Wieland in particular is very severely arraigned for the opinions to which he gave expression in his "Mensa und Confessio." Munich, 1906. "As the work," Dr. Pierse says, "does not contain an Imprimatur, it does not vouch for the opinion of any section of Catholics, but only for those of the author." It is very much to be regretted that Wieland's pamphlet "Die Schrift Mensa und Confessio und P. Emil Dorsch, S. J., in Innsbruck, Munich, 1908," in which he defends himself from charges similar to those brought by Dr. Pierse did not form the basis for an estimate of his opinions. Dr. Pierse is to be congratulated for having essayed to clear up the difficult questions centering around the idea of Sacrifice in the early church. Good use has been made of the *Monumenta Ecclesiae Liturgica* of Cabrol & Leclercq (not Leclerque). *Les Origines Liturgiques*, Paris, 1906, by Dom Cabrol, should have been read in the preparation of Chapter IX.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Early History of the Christian Church. From its Foundation to the End of the Third Century, by Monsignor Louis Duchesne, Hon. D. Litt., Oxford, and Litt. D., Cambridge, Membre de l'Institut de France. Rendered into English from the Fourth Edition. New York : Longmans, Green & Co.; London : John Murray, 1909. Pp. xx + 428.

This work now translated into English represents the fruits of the labor and research of one of the foremost historians of the present day. Its pages contain the answer to many of the questions which present themselves to those who are interested in the early fortunes of Christianity, but the work is much more than a mere record of events. In the thirty-seven brilliant chapters or essays of which it is composed are to be found so many vivid pictures taken from the titanic struggle which transformed the pagan Roman world into that new order in which the church stood prepared to do battle with the political forces unloosed by Diocletian and Galerius and the intellectual opposition called forth by the teachings of Arius. The manner in which this transformation is unfolded shows in every line the hand of a master in sympathy with the principles which ensured the victory and thoroughly conversant with every detail in the course of events leading thereto. The narrative is strong, consistent and well-balanced, and it is a source of gratification that this excellent work is now available in an English translation. Though pre-eminently a work for scholars, it will be no less useful for students who are taking their first lessons in the history of the church. The translation is in the main, very well done, and when one bears in mind the exceptional gift of concentration possessed by the author and the delicate shading which at times adorns his style, the few faults which it contains may all the more readily be pardoned. Now and then the translator (whose name is not given) verges on the colloquial as v. g. on p. 287, where the *qui ne s'entendaient pas entre eux et ne*, etc., of Duchesne is translated, "who neither hit it off with each other, nor," etc.; p. 317, *parvint à démasquer l'imposture*, is found as "succeeded in showing up the imposture." To say that Methodius "trounced Origen" (p. 361), even figuratively, is perhaps a little too strong.

While there is no agreement among writers in English as to the manner in which Greek and Latin names should be transliterated, consistency requires that the same spelling should prevail in one book. Thus for instance we find (p. 95) Elkesaites, (p. 227) Elkasaites; (p. 243) Coelosyria, (p. 331) Coele-Syria; Nicea (p. 211), Nicaea (p. 383);

Marcian (p. 304), Marcion (p. 305); Eleutherus (p. 172), Eleutherius (p. 332); Taurobola (pp. xx and 392), Taurobolia (p. 396); Patripassionism (p. 226), Patripassianism (p. 229). The mother of Alexander Severus is called Mammea (p. 266), and the famous opponent of Origen, Methodus (p. 254). It is hard to understand how this lack of uniformity crept in, as there is in most of the cases mentioned a form which is generally accepted. There are besides these many cases where the translation though perhaps correct does not express what the author intended. "Procédure contre les chrétiens" means not prosecution (p. 71) but procedure, the method of prosecution. "La colonne Antonine" is not the column of Antoninus (p. 182), but of Marcus Aurelius. Copies (p. 245) does not give the exact meaning of Florilèges, and it is doubtful whether Monsignor Duchesne in speaking of the "martyrologe hieronymien" actually meant to say martyrology of St. Jerome (p. 301), or wished to put himself in opposition to M. D'Arbois de Jubainville by calling those *aventuriers gaulois*, who in the 3rd century B. C. founded the little Celtic state in Phrygia and Pontus, adventurers from Gaul (p. 315). "Dans l'Histoire Auguste" means in the Augustan History, not in Augustian history (p. 349), and Puritans (p. 338) does not exactly mean cathares in the context. Rufus (p. 96) should be Rufinus and Callista (p. 177) Callistus. 2 Tim. v. 21, (p. 172) should be 2 Tim. iv. 21. Gallien (p. 219) should be Galen; Thrascius (p. 312) Thascius, and Gallus (p. 312) Gaius or Caius. Achillas is called Achilles (p. 356), while the Eunonium of the original faithfully reproduced (p. 357).

On page 141, note, there is a curious mistake. v. 377 and v. 385, meaning *vers* 377 and *vers* 386, and referring to the approximate dates of certain works by Epiphanius and Philastrius (also called Philaster, p. 227) are translated "see 377" and "see 385."

The translator's note, p. 253, is not accurate and should have been omitted. To speak of the provinces of Asia Minor as Pontus-with-Bithynia, etc., (p. 315) is clumsy. The usual form Bithynia-Pontus, which is in fact found later on, is much preferable. Besides these there are many typographical errors, which can be pardoned by supposing that the proofs were not read by one versed in church history, but it is hard to imagine why Leoncius of Antioch and St. John Chrysostom are spoken of in the same paragraph (p. 336). These mistakes and others of a similar character which we have not mentioned do not mar the general excellence of the work and in no way impair its usefulness for students or scholars; but it is to be hoped that

they will not be found in the next edition which ought to be soon called for if the work is received as it ought to be.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

La Foi Catholique. Par H. Lesêtre, Beauchesne, Paris, 1909. Pp. 497.

This volume tells the story of Catholic teaching so accurately and interestingly that one lays it down with the feeling of having been in the hands of a competent guide and interpreter. The author begins with a study of the powers and limitations of human reason. This is followed by a description of divine revelation where one sees the natural boundaries of human thought pushed back and overcome. Next comes the treatment of the church as the guardian and interpreter of the revealed deposit, and then in an orderly manner is taken up the entire Catholic teaching on the mysteries of faith, the supernatural life, the sacraments, divine providence, and the future life.

This volume is remarkable, first of all, for the fine, simple and clear presentation it gives of Catholic teaching. The structure of the book might well be said to rest on the definitions or declarations of the councils and the popes, references to which abound at every turn, furnishing the reader with a clear notion of what is of faith on each point considered, an advantage not always found in works of the kind. A second feature worthy of note is the living and interesting style, which is neither jejune nor packed, but well balanced, suggestive, and actual. When a writer can portray each item of doctrine distinctly and at the same time show its continuity and harmony with the rest, he is doing a real service to the exposition of Catholic truth. The presentation of the notion of faith, to mention one among many chapters equally good, is highly creditable.

The pastor of Saint-Etienne-du-Mont has written a volume which the cultivated may read with profit and the ignorant may study unto salvation. It has splendid material for a course of instructions.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

Histoire des Dogmes—II. De Saint Athanase à Saint Augustin. Par J. Tixeront. Lecoffre, Paris, 1909. Pp. 534.

Those who have had the pleasure and profit of reading the first

volume of the history of dogma published four years ago by the dean of the Catholic theological faculty of Lyons will find that experience repeats itself when the second volume, delayed somewhat in publication by the author's ill health, falls into their hands.

The period covered is about the same as that treated by Monsignor Duchesne in his second volume of the "Ancient History of the Church." In fact, the author of the work under review would be pleased to have it regarded, from the special standpoint of the history of dogma, as a complement of Monsignor Duchesne's. Not wishing to make the present volume too bulky, or to anticipate the treatment of matters, such as the Semi-Pelagian controversies, which rightly belong to another century, the author brings the second instalment of his labors to a close with the year 430, leaving to a future volume the continuation of the history down to Charlemagne.

Those familiar with the first volume will notice no change of governing principles in the second. There is, however, a slight departure from the method followed in the "Ante-Nicene Theology." Instead of isolating each writer for special analysis, a process that would have proved tedious, the author first presents the history of the Eastern and Western heresies, and then in two general chapters describes the doctrinal condition both of the Latin and the Greek Church. Saint Ephrem, Saint Aphraates, and Saint Augustine are considered separately, the two former on account of the difference of language, the latter because of his commanding stature and doctrinal importance. To offset any disadvantage that might arise from this combined treatment, an analytical table of contents is appended which enables the reader to reconstruct each writer either wholly or in detail according as desired. This method admirably preserves the scientific value of the author's labors for those who wish to follow closely in his steps, and at the same time increases the literary value for the general reader.

This second volume is equal, if not superior, to the first in its marvellous condensation, clearness, and precision. The author is no indifferent reporter of events, but a fair-minded judge who sifts the evidence thoroughly and does not hesitate to give his own personal appreciation of its bearing and drift. This judicious temper of mind is exhibited everywhere in the volume. It is invidious, of course, to single out any instance of this judiciousness as typical of the author's frame of mind, but the reader's attention may nevertheless be directed to the manner in which the moot question is disposed of, whether or not Saint Augustine regarded the gifts of Adam as natural belongings, or special divine bounties. Much has been written since the days of

the reformers and Michel de Bay, and even within the past decade, the purport of which was to show that the great Bishop of Hippo ignored entirely the question of the supernatural and regarded Adam as the normal natural man. M. Tixeront carefully avoids the anachronism which consists in reading St. Augustine in the light of distinctions that appeared centuries later. He establishes by means of textual criticism the fact that Saint Augustine considered the prerogatives of Adam, singly, if not severally, as effects of a special divine liberality. This fact he rescues from the perplexing terminology, and in it we already have the idea, if not the language, of later theology.

The author had the greater part of the volume written before the encyclical "Pascendi" appeared, and finds that it will stand the test of a second reading in the light of this recent pontifical document. Respect for the Fathers, he goes on to say, does not demand in a work of history any palliation of the speculative shortcomings of one or more individuals. Where there is such an abundance of light, a few shadows indicated by an historian will not mar the picture.

The genuine respect for the Fathers, the severity of method combined with the sympathy of appreciation, and the absence of all attempts to force the evidence unduly, all go to make this volume a worthy contribution to the history of dogma. The analytical and topical tables of contents increase its value and serviceableness for the professor, student, and general reader. In these days when so much that is unfair and untrue is written about early Catholic theology it is good to have M. Tixeront's work to recommend as an antidote. *Si quaeris monumenta, circumspice.*

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

The Life of St. Melania, by His Eminence Cardinal Rampolla. Translated by E. Leahy and edited by Herbert Thurston, S. J. Benziger Bros., New York, 1909. Pp. xxi + 164.

Some twenty-five years ago while Nuntio in Madrid Cardinal Rampolla found among some MSS. in the Escurial a Latin *Vita Melaniae Junioris.* A hasty perusal of the text convinced him that it contained a better form of the Life than that found in the version of the Metaphrast and he at once commenced to transcribe it with his own hand. The cares of office and the manifold occupations which fell to the lot of the Cardinal Secretary of State under Leo XIII prevented the

immediate accomplishment of his desire to publish a critical edition of the newly-found text. It was not until after the accession of Pius X that he found leisure to undertake the work which had been so long interrupted. It was published from the Vatican Press in 1905. As soon as it appeared the work was greeted with praise in every quarter. Critics were lavish in their encomiums of the scholarship displayed in its preparation and no less outspoken in their wonder that the Cardinal could after the lapse of twenty years return to the field of historical investigation and produce a work of such consummate erudition. The importance of the subject and the masterly manner in which it had been dealt with both deserved this flattering recognition. In the English translation we do not find a complete rendering of Cardinal Rampolla's work. It contains merely a "straightforward summary of the history of St. Melania and her times" which the Cardinal incorporated in his work. Brief as this is, it gives a good idea of the labor and care bestowed on the elucidation of the career of this marvellously interesting personage. The life of St. Melania (383–439) coincides with one of the most crucial periods in the history of Western civilization. She had as contemporaries some of the greatest figures in the annals of Christianity, and humble as she was she could not avoid being thrown into close contact with the leaders in civil as well as ecclesiastical affairs. She was the richest heiress in Rome and born of a family, whose rank and traditions were second to none in the Empire. How she overcame the opposition of her parents and husband to devote herself to a life of asceticism, the manner in which she disposed of her vast inheritance in the promotion of good works, and her final career of renunciation in the Holy Land is an interesting page from the annals of Christian effort. The picture of Roman society in the fourth century and the general decline of morality in the Empire which is shown as a background to the life of the saint is an excellent portrayal of the last scenes in the long drama of paganism and the prelude for that new order of events which commenced in the lifetime of Melania when the Goths made themselves masters of the Urbs Invicta. It was not considered advisable to make a complete translation of the work of Cardinal Rampolla, but the summary which is presented in this English version will throw an interesting light on the lives of other Christian Roman ladies of the same period, Paula, Eustochium and others, who reflected such glory in the declining days of the old Roman nobility. The charming Introduction by Father Thurston is a model of its kind, and will undoubtedly be read with much pleasure.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VI. Edited by Charles G. Herbermann, Ph. D., Edward A. Pace, Ph. D., D. D., Conde B. Pallen, Ph. D., LL. D., Thomas J. Shahan, D. D., John J. Wynne, S. J. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909.

This splendid volume adds another large instalment to the store of valuable information which the *Catholic Encyclopedia* is placing within the reach of the reading public.

It would be hard to find a more lucid presentation of a difficult subject than that contained in the article on God from the pen of Patrick J. Toner, S. T. D. This article is a model of exposition. Of course there is little in it that is new and this renders Dr. Toner's attractive presentation of the matter all the more meritorious. The treatment of the subject under two distinct heads as the God of Philosophy and the God of Theology will clear away the fog from the minds of many hazy thinkers on the subject. The brief summary of the controversy between the Dominican and the Jesuit schools, concerning the "divine knowledge," will be welcomed by many a theologian who has burned the midnight oil in the vain endeavor to find his way through this labyrinth. God, His Existence and His Attributes, have, ever since man began to think, occupied the foremost place in his difficult ascent towards the light which illumines the world. The vast literature of the subject is, accessible to the trained theologian, who is familiar with the ancient languages, but this article of Dr. Toner's puts the whole question in a form that is intelligible to the multitude of laymen who will naturally turn to the Encyclopedia for authentic information on all such subjects.

All who are interested in the cause of Catholic education in this country will welcome the article on France from the pen of Georges Goyau in this volume of the Encyclopedia. Confusing reports and fragments of information and misinformation have been reaching us concerning the strained relationship between the Church and the State in France during the last few years. This splendid presentation of the case, by one who is thoroughly familiar with every detail of the situation, will serve to clear up many misunderstandings. There is a lesson in it all that is worthy of careful study in this country at the present time where a movement not altogether dissimilar is making steady progress. Of course the French situation never could be created here, but the State here has undertaken the work of education and moreover it is pursuing a policy of de-Christianizing education. This may be necessary in the State schools, but there is a well-defined

movement in many quarters of this country looking towards an effectual de-Christianizing of the private and parochial schools of the country. A study of the history of the movement in France and in Germany should prove serviceable in awakening the friends of free education and particularly of religious education in this country to some of the dangers and consequences of the encroachment of State authority upon the rights of free citizens to control the education of their children. The calm and unbiased presentation of the facts and figures by Mr. Goyau makes very impressive reading. "The laicization of Primary Instruction" is particularly instructive and should be read side by side with the history of the public school system of the State of New York. "The law of the 28th of March, 1882, which made primary instruction obligatory, gratuitous, and secular (*laique*), intentionally omitted religious instruction from the curriculum of the public school, and provided one free day every week, besides Sunday, to allow the children, if their parents saw fit, to receive religious instruction; but this instruction was to be given outside the school building." This is a very mild beginning and it reminds one forcibly of the compromise which in this country a little more than a generation ago led to the conclusion that secular instruction might be separated out from all religious teaching and given to the children of the various denominations in the public schools, while their religious instruction might be effectively carried out in their homes and in the Sunday school. But let us follow the march of events in France. "The school regulations of 18 January, 1887, laid it down that the children could be sent to church for catechism or religious exercises only outside of class hours, and that teachers were not bound to take them to church or to watch over their behaviour while there. . . . The spirit of the law of 1882 implied that religious emblems should be excluded from the schools. . . . However, in the public schools dependent on the municipality of Paris, the anti-spiritualistic tendency became so violent that, after 1882, the new editions of certain school books expunged, even where they occurred in selected specimens of literature, the words *God, Providence, Creator*. . . . And while politicians were deprecating the assertion that the schools were Godless, the Masonic conventicles and the professional articles written by certain state pedagogues were explaining that the notion of God must eventually disappear in the school." Twelve years later M. Devinat, afterwards director of the normal school of the department of the Seine, wrote: 'To teach God, it is necessary to believe in God. Now, how are we to find in these days teachers whose souls are sincerely and profoundly religious? It

may be affirmed without any exaggeration that since 1882 the lay public school has been very nearly the Godless school.' . . . The very idea of neutrality in education, to which anti-religious teachers have not always consistently adhered, is now-a-days altogether out of favor with many members of the pedagogical profession. In 1904 the teachers of the department of the Seine advocated, almost unanimously, in place of 'denominational neutrality,' which they said was a lie, the establishment of a 'critical teaching,' which, in the name of science, should abandon all reserves in regard to denominational susceptibilities." And so all through the educational situation the movement has been the same. The examination and certification of teachers by the State, the elimination of religion first and then the insertion of anti-religious bias in the texts. Speaking of the pending bills, Mr. Goyau says: "Bills introduced by MM. Briand and Doumergue impose heavy penalties on fathers whose children refuse to make use of the irreligious books given them by their teachers, and render it impossible for parents to prosecute teachers whose immoral and irreligious instruction may give them reason for complaint." As to consequences, one can hardly help turning back to some suggestive statistics given at the beginning of this article. "There are two points to be noted in the study of French statistics. The annual mean excess of births over deaths for each 10,000 inhabitants during the period 1901–1905 in France was 18, while in Italy it was 106, in Austria 113, in England 121, in Germany 149, in Belgium 155. In 1907 the deaths were more numerous than the births, the number of deaths being 70,455, while that of the births was only 50,535—an excess of 19,920 deaths—and this notwithstanding the fact that in 1907 there were nearly 45,000 more marriages than in 1890. Official investigators attribute this phenomena to sterile marriages."

The splendid articles on Germany by Martin Spahn and Germans in the United States by Francis M. Schirp place at the disposal of the reader a wealth of information in a very convenient form which would require no little expenditure of time and energy to find elsewhere. The article on Greek Catholics in America by Andrew J. Shipman, Ph. D., will be a surprise to many, revealing as it does the recent development in our midst of a vast Oriental population with their peculiar customs and religious rites. The Western Catholic is usually an entire stranger to the religious customs and ceremonials of these peoples and though they are in our midst, we have had little knowledge of them. It is true that in many of our cities to-day these people are being forced upon our attention and we shall evidently have to

reckon with them in the near future as no inconsiderable element of our population. Nor has it been heretofore an easy matter to obtain authentic information. "Nothing, except a few newspaper and magazine articles, has been written in English or the Western European languages about the Greek Catholics in America. Their own publications must be consulted."

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

Scholasticism, by Joseph Rickaby, S. J. London: Archibald Constable & Co., 1908. Pp. 121. Price, $0.25.

This little book from the pen of the well-known Jesuit writer, Father Joseph Rickaby, is published as one of the series entitled *Philosophies Ancient and Modern*, issued by Messrs. Constable. It is a clear, popular, and on the whole, accurate statement of the origin, method and content of scholastic philosophy. Father Rickaby has the gift of lucid statement. He has the power of putting the abstract and recondite in a phrase so apt and so striking that the matter becomes easily intelligible. For instance, he sums up the difference between the *quod* and the *quo* of scholastic epistemology in the phrase "My consciousness is not the object but the instrument of my cognition" (p. 45). If he is not always accurate, the fault is not his perhaps, but is due to the difficulty, the impossibility, one might say, of putting within the limits of one hundred and twenty pages all that a man of Father Rickaby's erudition has to say about Scholasticism. He does not blink the defects and the mistakes of the scholastics. In fact he seems to us to admit too readily the excessive apriorism of the schoolmen. The volume should be provided with a more complete bibliography and the late Dr. Stöckl's name should be given correctly.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Could Bacon have Written the Plays? A Brief Study of Characteristics. By the Rev. George O'Neill, S. J., M. A., F. R. U. I. Dublin: E. Ponsonby, 116 Grafton St., 1909. Price, 6d.

Father O'Neill, who has been until recently a Fellow and Examiner of the Royal University of Ireland and has just been appointed to the Professorship of English Language and Philology in University College, Dublin, one of the constituent colleges of the new National Uni-

versity of Ireland, has in this little pamphlet of 31 pages supplied one among many good refutations of the charge, sometimes made, that literary matters are not studied in a scientific spirit or on scientific lines in British and Irish universities. Choosing a veritably Teutonic and microscopic phase of a very large and very vexed question, he examines it carefully, inside and out, in all its bearings and relations. He illuminates his theme with the light derived from a wide range of reading, from a scholarship which is none the less extensive and genuine because it is unobtrusive. His logic is pitiless and inexorable: he gives you proof of his contentions, and he *will* have your consent, unless you show him the unsoundness of the premises on which are based the inferences he wishes you to draw. For he lets you form your own conclusions: he does not categorically state them for you. Whatever may be the reader's subsequent impressions, it will be difficult for any earnest student, who is not an obstinate and bigoted anti-Baconian, to rise up from a careful perusal of this work without feeling that a very honest attempt has been made to prove that the answer to the question which forms the first part of the title must be in the affirmative.

I am all the more free to pay this tribute to Father O'Neill's power of marshalling facts and supplying arguments in support of the views he holds, because, for my own part, I have long ago convinced myself that the author of the plays in question was William Shakespeare, of Stratford-on-Avon, actor, and no other, and therefore, so far as the general controversy is concerned, I am not greatly concerned with what Bacon could or could not have done.

As might be expected by those who know Father O'Neill's judicial temperament, all he has to say is generally put forward calmly and dispassionately, with sweet reasonableness, and with scarcely any of that exuberance of rhetoric or invective with which followers of the Bacon versus Shakespeare controversy are unfortunately but too familiar. Having said so much for Father O'Neill's general fairness in handling his subject, I feel bound, however, to protest as emphatically as I can against his cavalier method of brushing aside the authority of Mr. Sidney Lee. Even after re-reading Mr. Greenwood's book, *The Shakespeare Problem Restated*, which Father O'Neill tells us finally demolishes that authority, I fail to see that Mr. Lee deserves to be accused of "groundless assumptions and air-built dogmatisms." Further, even at the risk of being counted in among "the unenlightened rank and file," I must express the faith that is in me by declaring that, in my opinion, all students of the Elizabethan and Jacobean drama are under deep obligations to Mr. Lee for his painstaking

researches in the by-ways as well as the high-ways of that most important tract of literary history.

Father O'Neill, in pursuit of his ultimate conclusion, gives many instances of Bacon's strong taste for poetry and the drama, and at these very few will, I think, be disposed to cavil. The inference of Bacon's possession of the dramatic faculty from the facts that he was a versatile conversationalist and could felicitously speak the language proper to each character which he assumed, and that in the letters which he wrote in the name of others he had a singular knack of catching their style, will not be so readily conceded. Somewhat firmer ground is taken when issue is joined with those who would deny to Bacon any claim to poetic inspiration. The pieces of admitted Baconian verse quoted, though respectable enough, are indeed not by any means conclusive of the possession of high poetic abilities by their author, or of the justice of placing him at all near the writer of the Sonnets or of Venus and Adonis. But the evidences of "the poetic spirit throbbing beneath the prose veil" of others of Bacon's works are extremely well brought out, and Bacon's imaginative power and poetic instinct are supported by apposite quotations from Addison, Pope, Macaulay, Mackintosh, Sir Alex. Grant, Lord Lytton, Taine, and Shelley.

The parallels instituted by Father O'Neill between some images expressed by Shakespeare in blank verse and similar images expressed by Bacon in prose are telling, and to many will be convincing. Thus in *Richard III*, II., III., we find :—

> Before the time of change . . . . men's minds mistrust
> Ensuing danger; as, by proof, we see
> The waters swell before a violent storm,

and in Bacon's Essay *Of Seditions and Troubles* :—

"As there are certain hollow blasts of wind, and secret swellings of seas, before a tempest, so there are in states."

Still more convincing are the short quotations from Bacon without reference to any other writer. Thus Bacon speaks, poetically enough, of "Remnants of history which have casually escaped the shipwreck of time;" and of the "ocean, the solitary handmaid of eternity." And the fairly long passage on "the end of studies" quoted by Father O'Neill is in itself almost enough to convince the sceptic that Bacon had in truth a poetic mind.

Tennyson's declaration that the same man could not have written

the essay *Of Love* and *Romeo and Juliet* gives occasion for a fairly exhaustive examination of Shakespeare's and Bacon's respective attitude towards the grand passion. This examination, based mainly on R. M. Theobald's *Shakespeare Studies in Baconian Light*, deals with *Troilus and Cressida; Romeo and Juliet; The Two Gentlemen of Verona; The Merry Wives of Windsor; A Midsummer Night's Dream; A Winter's Tale; Coriolanus; Macbeth; King Lear;* and *Antony and Cleopatra.* It endeavors to prove that the Baconian and the Shakespearean views of love are practically one and the same, and that therefore on this point there is no incongruity between the essay and the plays. But surely there is a flaw in the reasoning here. In the essay Bacon is expressing his own opinions, and they are severe enough on love. According to him love doth much mischief in life; it is the child of folly; if it check once with business, it troubleth men's fortunes, and maketh men that they can be no ways true to their own ends; great spirits and great business do keep out this weak passion; whosoever esteemeth too much of amorous affection, quitteth both riches and wisdom; it is impossible to love and to be wise; and so on: altogether a terrible indictment of the tender passion. On the other hand, Shakespeare is not speaking for himself; he puts into the mouths of his characters the expression suitable to the temperament of the speaker or to his mood of the moment, suitable too to place, time, and circumstance. Thus, if any one thinks that in the quotation from *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, given by Father O'Neill, it is Shakespeare, and not the character, who speaks he is liable to grievous error. Here is the passage:—

> To be in love, where scorn is bought with groans;
> Coy looks with heart-sore sighs; one fading moment's mirth
> With twenty watchful, weary, tedious nights:
> If haply won, perhaps a hapless gain;
> If lost, why then a grievous labour won;
> However, but a folly bought with wit,
> Or else a wit by folly vanquished . . . .
> Even so by love the young and tender wit
> Is turn'd to folly.

These Baconian sentiments are spoken by one who has not yet felt the smart of love to one who is sorely wounded by it, by Valentine to his friend Proteus. However, as the play proceeds, Valentine himself falls in love with Silvia, and when to him, in this state, comes Proteus, this is some of their dialogue:—

Pro. My tales of love were wont to weary you;
I know you joy not in a love-discourse.

Val. Ay, Proteus, but that life is alter'd now;
I have done penance for contemning Love,
Whose high imperious thoughts have punish'd me
With bitter fasts, with penitential groans . . . .
O, gentle Proteus, Love's a mighty lord,
And hath so humbled me, as I confess
There is no woe to his correction,
Nor, to his service no such joy on earth.
Now no discourse, except it be of love.

I respectfully submit that the dramatist is, in these two contradictory passages put into the mouth of the same character, not voicing his own views, but is simply doing what every playwright has to do, namely, making the *dramatis personae* express the sentiments that are appropriate to the occasion, to their temporary mood, or to their general character. There is no use therefore in trying to make out that, because Friar Lawrence upbraids Romeo's violent passion, Shakespeare is, through him, expressing sentiments akin to those found in Bacon's essay. When the wise and benevolent Friar reproaches Romeo thus :—

Art thou a man? thy form cries out thou art:
Thy tears are womanish; thy wild acts denote
The unreasonable fury of a beast:
Unseemly woman in a seeming man!
Or ill-beseeming beast in seeming both! . . . .
Fie, fie! thou sham'st thy shape, thy love, thy wit . . . .
Thy wit, that ornament to shape and love,
Mis-shapen in the conduct of them both;

or when he declares that

These violent delights have violent ends,
And in their triumph die; like fire and powder
Which as they kiss consume: the sweetest honey
Is loathsome in his own deliciousness,
And in the taste confounds the appetite.
Therefore love moderately!

he is but fulfilling the function which any ordinary spiritual adviser would feel called upon, in soberer and less dramatic language of course, to discharge to any young man affected like Romeo. Similar reasoning applies to other passages; but I think that enough has been said on this head to prove that the analogy attempted to be set up between the essay and the plays cannot be sustained.

The contemporary panegyrics on Bacon's poetic powers expressed on his death are used to show how high he stood in that regard in the opinion of those who knew him and presumably had the opportunity of judging aright. It is remarkable how nearly all those posthumous praises converge on Bacon the poet, to the exclusion of Bacon the scientist, Bacon the philosopher, or Bacon the lawyer. This argument could of course be easily pushed too far: contemporary writers through lack of perspective have been known to err lamentably in judgment, and it is at least possible that the same objection applies in the present case. Wisely, therefore, Father O'Neill does not rely on the testimony as conclusive.

His deductions from Bacon's character, which is shown in a very different light from that in which it is usually viewed, are among the most powerful in the pamphlet.

On the whole, this little work may be fittingly described as a valuable contribution to the literature of one portion of a great question. I have pointed out weakness here, and flaws there ; but the general impression is one of sincerity and of scientifically applied scholarship. Those who, like Sir Edward Sullivan in his article in the August number of *The Nineteenth Century and After*, are irrevocably committed to the attitude of decrying Bacon's poetic gifts, will as a matter of course see nothing in Father O'Neill's booklet to make them change their opinion ; but outside extreme partisans it will carry weight.

One wonders whether Father O'Neill, having seemingly settled to his own satisfaction the point as to whether Bacon *could* have written the Shakespeare plays, will take the next obvious, though not necessarily logical, step, and essay to prove that he *did* write them. Should he do so, he will be a strong accession to the ranks of the Baconians.

P. J. Lennox.

BOOK NOTICES.

One who understands thoroughly the demands which the life of a priest in America makes on the young candidate for orders has given us in the little volume THE YOUNG PRIESTS' KEEPSAKE the result of his own experience as a missionary in the United States. The author is the Reverend Michael J. Phelan, S. J. The chapters on "Culture," "English," "Sermon-writing," "Preparation of Sermons," "Elocution," etc., were written originally for the *Mungret Annual* and have already commended themselves to the readers of that publication as eminently useful. Father Phelan has in mind especially the young Irishman who has chosen America as the scene of his sacerdotal ministry. His book will appeal to others as well, and should find a place in every library of pastoral theology. We are glad to note that the volume is printed and bound in Ireland and bears the Irish national trade-mark. It is sold by Benziger Bros.

A series of Texts and Documents for the study of the history of Christianity has been planned by MM. Hemmer and Lejay and is being published by Alphonse Picard, Paris. The latest volume to appear is a study of Philo and his allegorical interpretation of the Law. It is from the pen of Dr. Émile Bréhier, and is entitled PHILON, COMMENTAIRE ALLEGORIQUE DES SAINTS LOIS. It contains a sketch of Philo's Life, an introductory study of his *Allegories of the Law* and the Greek text of the three books of that treatise, with a French translation. Only those who are acquainted with the exceptional qualities of Philo's style, with his involved method of expression and his frequent insistence on the value of verbal resemblances can realize the difficulty of the task which Dr. Bréhier has undertaken and which, so far as we can judge, he has successfully accomplished. The book will interest the student of philosophy as well as the theologian.

Under the title LE MODERNISME, SA POSITION *vis-à-vis* DE LA SCIENCE, etc., Bloud et Cie, Paris, have published the discourse pronounced by Cardinal Mercier on December 8, 1907, in the Assembly Hall of the University of Louvain. To this the publishers add the Cardinal's Pastoral Letter for the Lent of 1908 on *La condemnation du modernisme.* Both documents are thus brought within easy reach of the student of contemporary theological thought.

A collection of short stories from the pen of François Veuillot, nephew of the great Catholic journalist Louis Veuillot, has just been published by Benziger Brothers under the title HUMBLE VICTIMS. The translator is also a member of a family that has rendered distinguished services to Catholic literature, Miss Susan Gavan Duffy, daughter of the celebrated Young Irlander, Gavan Duffy, editor of the *Nation.* The stories, including five charming Christmas tales, while not of the typical Sunday school sort, are suited for Sunday school use. They are full of human tenderness and human interest, and appeal to all who appreciate the inconspicuous virtues and the uncanonized sanctity so often met with in the lives of the poor, the ignorant and the humble.

It is difficult to characterize or even to describe the simple pathos and the noble

Christian optimism of a collection of poems edited by Father Matthew Russell, S. J., under the title LITTLE ANGELS (Benziger Brothers). The subtitle *A Book of Comfort for Mourning Mothers* gives a clue to the nature of the contents. The poems are about "Children who die early and go back to God soon—we call them little Angels." Running through the book, is a thread of "Reflections" by Father Russell himself. This is by no means the least beautiful part of the book.

The latest volume of the series (published by Beauchesne, Paris) *Etudes sur l'histoire des religions* is LA DOCTRINE DE L'ISLAM by Baron Carron de Vaux. This distinguished Catholic scholar has already rendered signal service to the cause of philosophy by his volumes on *Avicenne* (Alean, 1900), *Gazali* (Alcan, 1902) and the manuals on *Leibniz*, *Newton*, *Gallilée* (Bloud, 1906). Neither is this his first contribution to the History of Religions. His work *Le Mahometisme* (Champion, 1895) is well known to all students of that subject. The work just published, a study of orthodox Islamism, will, we have no doubt, be read with a great deal of interest, now that the Mahometan world commands so much attention, and seems to be bestirring itself intellectually and religiously as well as politically. The author attributes to the simplicity and directness of the Mussulman faith, and to its independence of philosophical reflection, that attractiveness which, in spite of its primitive barbarity, the religion of Islam is still capable of exercising on the mind of a Christian student.

The title A. B. C. OF PHILOSOPHY (Fenno and Co., New York) may induce some perplexed student of philosophical problems to welcome Miss Landsberg's little volume as a key to the difficulties which beset him. He will find there a very elementary disquisition on some current philosophical terms followed by a jejune and too often inaccurate sketch of the succession of systems of philosophy. He may be astonished to learn that, according to Aristotle God is the "Propeller" of the Universe. He will learn other things too, which he shall have to unlearn if he takes the trouble to verify the statements regarding the Scholastics.

Among the "Iona Series" of the publications of the Catholic Truth Society of Ireland is a very interesting little volume on Father Marquette, entitled HIAWATHA'S BLACK-ROBE by E. Leahy (Dublin, Catholic Truth Society of Ireland, 24 Upper O'Connell Street). The sketch of the man and the missionary is clear, forceful and sympathetic. The details regarding the events connected with the Statue in Statuary Hall are narrated fully and impartially, and there is added by way of Appendix a series of quotations from Father Marquette's "Journal" which placed in juxtaposition with certain stanzas of Longfellow's "Hiawatha" show how closely the poet adhered even to the phraseology and vocabulary of the missionary's narrative.

A new text-book on rhetoric entitled WRITING AND SPEAKING, by Dr. Charles S. Baldwin, of Yale University, and published by Longmans bids fair to establish itself as a standard classbook in a department, in which one might imagine there was hardly room for another handbook. Dr. Baldwin's book is practical; it is clear and definite in its precepts and happy, we think, in its choice of examples.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Solemn Opening of the University. On Sunday, October 10, the Mass of the Holy Ghost was celebrated in the Chapel of Divinity Hall in the presence of the members of the various Faculties and the students of the University. After the solemn profession of faith had been made by professors and instructors, the Rector, Right Reverend Doctor Shahan, addressed the students and spoke of the advantages of a university education.

Meeting of the Board of Trustees. On Wednesday, November 17, the semi-annual Meeting of the Board of Trustees was held in Divinity Hall. There were present His Eminence Cardinal Gibbons, Chancellor of the University and President of the Board; Archbishop Ryan, of Philadelphia; Archbishop Glennon, of St. Louis; Archbishop Moeller, of Cincinnati; Archbishop Messmer, of Milwaukee; Archbishop Blenk, of New Orleans; Archbishop Kern, of St. Louis; Archbishop Ireland, of St. Paul; Bishop Maes, of Covington; Bishop Foley, of Detroit; Bishop Harkins, of Providence; Mgr. Lavelle, of New York; Mgr. Shahan, rector; Messrs. Michael Cudahy, of Chicago; Eugene Philbin, of New York, and Walter George Smith, of Philadelphia.

The transfer of the Library from Caldwell to McMahon Hall was approved and general satisfaction expressed with the results obtained. The Trustees were very much pleased to learn of the additional advantages afforded professors and students by the new arrangement.

The question of establishing a Teacher's Institute was discussed and steps were taken towards the realization of that work.

The recommendation of the Rector that a central power, heating and lighting plant be installed was favorably received and the Rector was instructed to study the available sites and present plans and estimates at the next meeting.

Reverend Doctor Thomas Edward Shields, Associate Professor of Psychology, was promoted to the rank of Professor of Physiological Psychology and Pedagogy.

Reverend Doctor William Turner, Associate Professor of Philosophy, was promoted to the rank of Professor of Logic and History of Philosophy.

Doctor Charles H. McCarthy, Associate Professor of American History, was promoted to the rank of Professor of American History.

Right Reverend Monsignor Shahan. At the Meeting of the Board of Trustees the papal brief formally announcing the elevation of the Rector to the rank of Domestic Prelate was read and recorded. This signal mark of the esteem and approbation of the Holy See, bestowed in the most solemn manner on the Rector of the University, is mentioned with very special pleasure in the pages of the *Bulletin,* which owes so much to Dr. Shahan's untiring and unselfish devotion.

The Knights of Columbus Endowment. The Board of Trustees was very much pleased with the report of the progress made by the Knights of Columbus in their project to collect $500,000. for the purpose of endowing fifty scholarships at the University. Over seventy-five per cent. of the Councils and members of the Order have signified their willingness to contribute.

The A. O. H. Scholarships. The Rector in his annual report writes: " Of the fifty scholarships that the Ancient Order of Hibernians agreed to establish on the occasion of their late National Convention, four have so far been available, from New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Montana. Steps have been taken to induce the Catholic Knights of America to execute their praiseworthy resolution to found a Chair at the University."

Donations. The most notable donations mentioned in the Rector's Report are Mrs. Bellamy Storer's gift of $10,000;

the estate of the late Mrs. Lusby, of Baltimore, about $120,000; the estate of Patrick F. Sullivan, of Boston, $4,750; the estate of Rev. Aloysius Murphy, of Rome, N. Y., $3,000; the estate of Mrs. Ellen Christy, of Cincinnati, $250.

The University has been bequeathed $12,000 by the will of the late Martin F. Kavanagh, of Brooklyn, N. Y.

Collections. The annual collection for 1908 amounted to $91,130.30. The "Cardinal's Fund" for the same year reached the total of $7,930.00.

Archbishop Hennessy Scholarships. An additional scholarship has been founded out of the estate of the late Archbishop Hennessy, of Dubuque.

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA.

GENERAL BALANCE SHEET, SEPT. 30, 1909, and Sept. 30, 1908, AND COMPARISON.

ASSETS.	Sept. 30, 1909.	Sept. 30, 1908.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.
LANDS AND BUILDINGS:				
University Grounds and Farm	$ 39,899.90	$ 39,899.90		
Caldwell Hall	338,242.78	338,242.78		
McMahon Hall	310,969.33	310,969.33		
Albert Hall	50,444.03	50,444.03		
St. Thomas' College	1,000.00	1,000.00		
Observatory	4,654.51	4,654.51		
Cottage	7,876.38	7,876.38		
Tenant House	644.42	644.42		
Farm Buildings	7,235.80	7,235.80		
Long Branch Real Estate	27,000.00	27,000.00		
Total Lands and Buildings	$ 787,967.15	$ 787,967.15		
APPARATUS AND EQUIPMENT:				
Caldwell Hall	17,513.48	19,343.99		$ 1,830.51
McMahon Hall	5,656.04	6,230.53		574.49
Albert Hall	2,170.85	2,412.05		241.20
Chapel	3,280.50	3,645.00		364.50
Divinity Library	19,468.22	19,849.41		381.19
Bouquillon Library	5,000.00	5,000.00		
Educational Departments	34,141.81	35,391.21		1,249.40
Instrument Shop	3,185.27	3,539.19		353.92
Total Apparatus and Equipment	$ 90,416.17	$ 95,411.38		$ 4,995.21
ENDOWMENT PROPERTY:				
Real Estate—Chicago, Ill	$ 13,000.00	13,000.00		
Real Estate—Omaha, Neb		13,271.36		$ 13,271.36
Total Endowment Property	$ 13,000.00	26,271.36		13,271.36
THE REV. THOMAS BREHONY FELLOWSHIP FUND:				
Reading Company and Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company General Mortgage 4% Bonds	$ 10,000.00	$ 10,000.00		
INVESTMENTS:				
Bonds, Certificates of Indebtedness, and Stocks	$ 683,362.55	$ 608,684.55	$ 74,678.00	
Ground Rents—Baltimore, Md	5,442.65	5,442.65		
Mortgage on Cincinnati, Ohio, Property	3,000.00	3,500.00		$ 500.00
Total Investments	$ 691,805.20	$ 617,627.20	$ 74,178.00	
CURRENT ASSETS:				
Cash on Hand and in Banks:				
Rev. George A. Dougherty, Asst. Treasurer	$ 466.57	80.32	386.25	
Rev. Charles B. Schrantz, Procurator	274.83	199.90	74.93	
Mr. Thomas J. Thompson, Proctor	55.34	34.55	20.79	
The National Savings & Trust Company, Washington, D. C	28,000.00	24,000.00	4,000.00	
Riggs National Bank, Washington, D. C	4,646.89	1,204.29	3,442.60	
Total	$ 33,443.63	$ 25,519.06	$ 7,924.57	
Notes Receivable	1,000.00	$ 1,000.00		
Deposit for Perpetual Insurance	875.00	875.00		
Total Current Assets	$ 35,318.63	$ 27,394.06	$ 7,924.57	
DEFERRED ASSETS:				
Uncollected Subscriptions—Guaranty Fund for General Expenses	4,346.00	4,446.00		$ 100.00
Uncollected Endowment		10,000.00		10,000.00
Total Deferred Assets	$ 4,346.00	$ 14,446.00		$ 10,100.00
Waggaman Real Estate Loans	$ 794,506.71	$ 799,424.74		$ 4,918

LIABILITIES.	Sept. 30, 1909.	Sept. 30, 1908.	Increase.	Decrease.
Capital	$ 767,701.56	$ 713,518.43	$ 54,183.13	
Donations, Endowments and Bequests:				
Lands and Buildings:				
University Grounds and Farm	$ 29,899.90	$ 29,899.90		
Caldwell Hall	220,100.10	220,100.10		
McMahon Hall	221,436.60	221,436.60		
Total Donations—Lands and Buildings	$471,436.60	$ 471,436.60		
Endowments:				
Chairs—Caldwell Hall:				
Fully Endowed	$ 350,000.00	$ 350,000.00		
Partially Endowed	4,750.00	4,750.00		
Chairs—McMahon Hall:				
Fully Endowed	425,000.00	425,000.00		
Partially Endowed	76,729.97	75,229.97	$ 1,500.00	
Archbishop Kenrick's Chair—Partially Endowed	11,783.00	11,783.00		
Archbishop Williams' Chair—Partially Endowed	8,240.00	8,140.00	100.00	
Fellowships—Caldwell Hall	25,000.00	25,000.00		
Fellowships—McMahon Hall	10,000.00	10,000.00		
Scholarships—Caldwell Hall	149,510.79	144,510.79	5,000.00	
Scholarships—McMahon Hall	7,685.39	19,675.55		$ 11,990.16
General Endowments	11,510.00	11,485.00	25.00	
Bouquillon Library Endowment	2,585.00	2,585.00		
Total Endowment	$1,082,794.15	$1,088,159.31		$ 5,365.16
Estate of A. F. Ryan	105,427.55	105,427.55		
Total Donations, Endowments and Bequests	$1,659,658.30	1,665,023.46		$ 5,365.16
TOTAL LIABILITIES	$2,427,359.86	$2,378,541.89	$ 48,817.97	

We have examined the books and records of The Catholic University of America for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1909, have verified all cash and security balances by count or by certificates of Depositories, and

We hereby certify that the above General Balance Sheet agrees with the records of the University and is correct.

(Signed) Haskins & Sells,
Certified Public Accountants.

New York, *October* 18, 1909.